
GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD ORDER: FOUR PARADIGMATIC VIEWS

Kavous Ardalan

Globalization and world order, as any other phenomenon, can be seen through different lenses or worldviews. This paper views globalization and world order from the vantage point of four different broad worldviews: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. Correspondingly, the paper provides four different explanations of globalization and world order. These four explanations are equally meritorious. Each explanation focuses on a certain aspect of globalization and world order. Collectively, they provide a much broader, deeper, and balanced understanding of globalization and world order.

Keywords: globalization, world order, worldviews, paradigms, education.

1. Introduction

Globalization and world order, as any other phenomenon, can be seen through different lenses or worldviews. This paper views globalization and world order from the vantage point of four broad worldviews: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. Indeed, this paper follows the same approach as in Ardalan (2010), which provided four different views of globalization and finance from the vantage point of the four broad worldviews: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. Similarly, this paper provides four different explanations of globalization and world order (see Fig. 1). These four explanations are equally meritorious. Each explanation focuses on a certain aspect of globalization and world order. Collectively, they provide a much broader, deeper, and balanced understanding of globalization and world order.

Based on Burrell and Morgan (1979), Ardalan (2010) discusses the four paradigms, which can be summarized as follow:

The functionalist paradigm assumes that society's existence is concrete and orderly. These assumptions lead to the view that the social science is objective and value-free and that it can provide the true explanation and prediction of the social reality that exists 'out there'. It assumes that the external world is governed by external rules and regulations. Scientists' role is to find the orders that prevail within the subject of their analysis.

The interpretive paradigm assumes that individuals' network of assumptions and intersubjectively-shared meanings constitutes social reality. It, therefore, believes that communities of individuals share multiple-realities which they sustain and change. It regards the role of the interpretive researchers as finding the orders that prevail within the phenomenon under their consideration; however, these orders are not regarded as objective.

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


Fig. 1. The Four Paradigms

Note: Each paradigm adheres to a set of fundamental assumptions about the nature of science (*i.e.*, the subjective-objective dimension), and the nature of society (*i.e.* the dimension of regulation-radical change).

The radical humanist paradigm provides critiques of the status quo and is concerned to articulate the sociology of radical change, modes of domination, emancipation, deprivation, and potentiality. It views the consciousness of human beings as dominated by the ideological superstructure of the social system. It seeks to change the social world through a change in consciousness. It believes that truth is historically-specific.

The radical structuralist paradigm assumes that reality is objective and concrete. Sociologists working within this paradigm analyze the basic class interrelationships within the total social formation and emphasize that radical change is inherent in the structure of society and takes place through political and economic crises. It is through this radical change that the emancipation of human beings from the social structure is materialized.

In what follows, Sections 2 to 5 provide four different explanations of globalization and world order based on one of the four broad worldviews or paradigms. Section 6 is the conclusion.

2. Functionalist View

Associated with the drafting of the UN Charter has been a stream of theories – called liberal institutionalism – that has endeavored to discern the emergence of institutions that would transform the world order by progressively bringing the state system under an authoritative regulation. This stream has generated a sequence of theoretical formulations, each of which has been replaced by its successor (for more literature see Diamond 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2008; Doyle 1983, 1999; Frederick 1993; Fukuyama 1992; Haas 1958, 1964, 1990; Haas and Schumpeter 1964; Held and McGrew 2002; Karatnycky 1999; Kindleberger 1969; Long 1995; Mitrany 1943; Ohmae 1990; Reinecke 1997; and Schumpeter 1976. This section is based on Cox 1996).

The earliest formulation was functionalism. It envisaged a route through the 'low politics' of functional or technical agencies. Its principal argument was that by associating professionals and technicians with international agencies, cooperation among states would increase. This is because professionals and technicians are primarily concerned with solving practical problems of everyday life – such as delivering the mail on time, and promoting health, education, and welfare. When these professionals and technicians are placed within international agencies that are charged with these kinds of matters, the conflictual sphere of 'high politics' of diplomats and political leaders would be circumvented and diminished by the cooperative sphere of functionalism. That is, the world government would arrive through functional activities rather than by design.

Functionalism was embodied in the specialized agencies that constituted component parts of the UN system. It gained relevancy with the UN expansion of technical assistance in less-developed countries beginning in the 1960s. This was when countries were helping to build the state structures as the foundation of the world system.

Functionalism, however, offered no theory of how a more centralized world authority would emerge. Neo-functional theory filled this gap by noting that the scope and authority of international institutions would increase through a conscious strategy of leadership. Innovative leadership should extend any major field of functional competence entrusted to an international institution to related fields that have no assigned international authority. This was called the 'spillover' effect. Neo-functionalism added to the list of relevant actors some elements of civil society: trade unions, industrial associations, consumer groups and other advocacy groups, and political parties. The positive attitude of these interest groups towards international institutions would increase the authority of these institutions.

Neo-functionalism considered the broadening of scope and authority of international institutions as a process of integration. It enjoyed its greatest success in the process of European economic integration. This prompted its application to non-European situations. In its application to Latin America, actors such as autonomous interest groups and political parties were replaced by technocratic elites. Its application to the world as a whole was less plausible.

Functionalism and neo-functionalism were both challenged by political events. The East-West conflicts of the Cold War; the North-South unresolved political issues that remained after the decolonization of the 1960s (most notably southern African and the Arab-Israeli conflicts); and other political conflicts could not be dominated by technical cooperation. Accordingly, functionalism and neo-functionalism appeared as an ideology of the western capitalist powers, that is the politicization of technical work.

After functionalism and neo-functionalism lost theoretical ground, liberal institutionalism shifted its vision. It changed its focus from superseding the state through some larger regional or world integration, to cooperative arrangements among states.

Starting in the early 1970s, interest shifted to transnational relations. It intensified the emphasis that neo-functionalism placed on civil society as a network of relations that both extends and circumscribes the autonomy of state action. The world economy took the center stage, not only as business organizations that operated on a global scale, but also as the emergence of a transnational community among those people who were most directly involved. More recently, alongside interest groups, emphasis has been placed on 'epistemic communities', that is transnational networks of specialists who share a way of conceiving and defining global problems in specific areas of concern.

Corresponding to the development of transnational civil society is the fragmentation of the state. States are perceived as containing competing agencies. An agency in one state might build a network with its counterparts in other states in order to enhance its influence within its own state. International institutions are now more complex: they are both constrained by the transnational network of global civil society such as the networks of international production and global finance; and by the trans-governmental networks constructed by bureaucratic segments within various states.

The phenomenon of 'complex interdependence' led to the idea of 'regimes', which is a set of rules accepted by a group of states in dealing with a certain area of common concerns. The notion deals with how cooperation is achieved and sustained without necessarily having to deal with formal international organizations. Moreover, it deals with cooperation, not with superseding the state authority. Regime theory focuses upon 'rational actors' who act under conditions of 'bounded rationality', that is in the absence of having full information and continuous calculation of self-interest, but relying on procedures that have worked reasonably well in the past. One consequence of the predominance of regime theory in recent liberal institutionalism has been a shift of emphasis back to states as the principal actors.

Central to the regime theory is the thesis of 'hegemonic stability', according to which regimes have been constituted and protected by dominant powers. Liberal institutionalist analysis based on rational-choice assumptions suggests that even when such dominant powers decline, existing forms of cooperation survive because they continue to provide states with cost-saving, uncertainty-reducing, and flexible means of achieving the results of cooperation.

Liberal institutionalism, with its various theoretical phases, has certain basic characteristics. Its epistemology is both positivist and rational-deductive. This is because its objects of enquiry are actors and their interactions and it attempts to analyze their behavior according to models of rational choice. Liberal institutionalism takes the existing order as given and attempts to make it work more smoothly. Liberal institutionalism does not attempt to criticize and change the existing order.

Liberal institutionalism starts with the state system and world capitalist economy and tries to make these two global structures compatible; and tries to ensure stability and predictability in the world economy. Indeed, regime theory explains well the economic cooperation among the G7 and other advanced capitalist countries. But, it cannot explain as well the attempts made to change the structure of world economy. This is because regimes are designed to stabilize the world economy and prevent radical departures from economic orthodoxy, for example, through socialism. Liberal institutionalism is consistent with a conservatively adaptive attitude towards the existing structures of world order.

3. Interpretive View

Realism places primary emphasis on states and analyzes the historical behavior of states, but it does not limit its vision to states. Realism is also concerned with how the economic and social phenomena are related to states and how the nature of states changes. Realism does not view the state as an absolute, but historicized (see Brown 1995; Carr 1981; Gilpin 1981; Held and McGrew 2002; Hirst 2001; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Huntington 1993; Keohane 1986, 1990, 1998; Keohane and Nye 1977; Krasner 1983, 1995; Low 1997; McNeill 1997; Morgenthau 1948; Spiro 1999; Waltz 1979, 1999; Weiss 1998; and Wolf 1999. This section is based on Cox 1996).

When states are the most significant powerful entities in global power relations, and each state is constrained in its ambitions by the threat of retaliation by other states, then the world order is conceived of a series of transitory arrangements among a group of states that find a temporary common interest in order to achieve their collective purposes. Such a system is driven by changes in the relative powers of the states and the shifts in their interests. These lead to a new composition of groupings of states that have a new set of common or compatible purposes.

In the realist conception of world order, international institutions and general principles of international law or behavior have a superstructural character. That is, they are means to achieve ends, which emanate from the real conflicts of interest that underlie the system. In the same way that the ruling class in a territorial state denounces class war and tries to maintain domestic peace in order to guarantee its own security and predominance, the international peace is of special interest to predominant powers. Indeed, that state governs that supplies the power necessary for the purpose of governing.

In the realist perspective, even when there is a considerable proliferation of international institutions, they lack almost any cumulative authority. International organizations are agencies with no real autonomy in articulating collective purposes and mobilizing resources to implement these purposes. They are conduits for publicly endorsing and putting into effect the purposes of those states that provide the resources necessary for attaining them. International institutions are public organizations designed to legitimate privately-determined policies and actions. Such legitimizations are based on principles that are suspect as rationalizations of ulterior motives. The critical realist analyst reveals the basic purposes at work. Claims made based on the principles invoked constitute irrelevant distraction from the real issue which is to be revealed as the basic interests at work. Only by exposing these interests can effective counteracting forces be organized, which, in turn, might utilize international institutions and principles of law and morality to further their different purposes.

Realism is capable of recognizing the phenomenon of moral sentiment. That is, the powerful recourse to moral principles in order to secure acquiescence from the less powerful shows that moral sentiments constitute a force in inter-personal and even inter-state affairs. On the other hand, the people make moral judgment with respect to state behavior and constrain the actions of state, even though the state is a purely fictitious person. Therefore, moral sentiments with all likelihood play some role in the formulation of state purposes. Realists do not place too heavy a burden of practice upon moral sentiment and expose the hypocrisy with which moral sentiment disguises egoistic intents.

Realism provides a remarkable explanation for the world order. The United States stood aloof from the UN system during the 1970s crisis based on the perception that the Soviet veto power in the Security Council and the Third World majority in the General Assembly could reverse the endorsement of US goals in such international organizations. Meanwhile, economic forces that predominantly reflected US interests were weakening both the Soviet bloc and the Third World. The United States ignored the United Nations as a center of multilateral activity and let economic forces to continue to shift power relations in its favor.

Realism also provides an explanation for the second phase of the crisis of world order. The withdrawal of Soviet power – which used to be a counterweight to US power – and the Soviet support of the US positions in the Security Council, combined with

the continuing exertion of financial pressures on Third World countries guaranteed a favorable response to US initiatives in the Security Council. Most Third World countries that were under financial pressures of external debt were required to open their economies further to the penetration of the dominant forces in the world economy under the leadership of the United States. No Third World country could seek to employ its economic resources in its own interest and in opposition to external market forces, because it posed a challenge to the global economic system that, even if not substantively threatening, could become contagious. No Third World country could seek to build a military challenge to the system, because it would face a military action authorized by a Security Council which was under US dominance. In the realist interpretation, the real reasons for the US initiation of war against Iraq were kept obscured by the public ritual in the Security Council.

Realism's epistemological foundations are historicism and hermeneutics. Realism has a critical aspect because it does not accept appearances but seeks to penetrate the phenomenon and find meaning from within. It is concerned with historical structures as well as events. The term 'historical structures' refers to those persisting patterns of thought and actions that define the frameworks within which people and states act. These historical structures are shaped and reshaped slowly over time. They constitute the intersubjective realities of national and world politics. In realism, the analysis involves the process of inferring the meaning of events within these historically-defined frameworks for thought and action.

The critical aspect of realism is more at the service of the weak than of the strong. Machiavelli is probably the first critical theorist of European thought. Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-century Islamic diplomat and scholar, is probably the first critical theorist of his civilization. Probably there are other instances of critical theory in other traditions of civilization. In form, Machiavelli's Prince appears to be addressed to the powerful. In effect, his work instructs the outsiders in the mechanisms of power. The critical aspect of realism is a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power.

It should be noted that neo-realism severs realism from its critical aspect and converts it into a problem-solving device for the foreign-policy decision-makers of the most powerful states. Neo-realism is largely an American product of the Cold War and attempts to construct a technology of state power. It calculates the components of power of each state, and evaluates the relative chances of different possible moves by each state in their game of international power politics. Its epistemology is positivist and it lacks any consideration of historical structural change. The world of inter-state relations is taken as given, with no change in its basic structure over time. Changes take place only within the system, but the system itself remains intact.

4. Radical Humanist View

Historical dialectic regards historical structures as patterns of human activity and thought that persist over long periods of time. They are created by human collectivity in responses to its common problems – such as those related to the satisfaction of material wants (economics), the organization of cooperation and security (politics), or the explanation of the human condition and purpose (religion and ideology) – that form practices, institutions, and inter-subjective meanings of a significant group of people. These practices and meanings constitute the objective world for these people (see Archibugi

1995; Archibugi and Held 1995; Archibugi, Held, and Kohler 1998; Bobbio 1988; Burnheim 1985, 1986; Connolly 1991; Cox 1993, 1996, 1997, 1999; Deudney 1998; Dryzek 1990, 1995, 2000; Ekins 1992; Falk 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1999; Gill 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Held 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1999; Held and McGrew 2002; Held *et al.* 1999; Hobsbawm 1994; Kant 1795; Korten 1995; Linklater 1996; McGrew 1997, 2002; Mittelman 1996; Murphy 2005b; Patomaki 2000; Robinson 1996a, 1996b; Rosenau 1997; Rosenberg 1994; Sakamoto 1997; Sandel 1996; Shaw 1994; Sklair 2001; Thompson 1999; and Walker 1988, 1991. This section is based on Cox 1996).

Historical structures are historical because they are created in particular historical circumstances and can be explained as responses to these circumstances. In the same way, they change when material circumstances change or when prevailing meanings and purposes are challenged by new practices.

The dialectical approach helps to understand change. That is, a society produces in its structure the antagonisms that lead to its modification. The method used in historical dialectic is therefore both dialectical in its explanation of change; and hermeneutic in its enquiry into purposes and meanings, and relates subjectivity and objectivity to its explanation of a socially-constructed world order.

Historical dialectic not only enquires into the social processes that create and transform forms of state and the state system, but also inquires into the changes in perceptions and meanings that create and recreate the objective world order.

Historical dialectic proceeds from an assessment of the dominant tendencies in the existing world order, and moves on to an identification of the antagonisms generated within that world order that could lead to structural transformation. That is, historical dialectic perceives world order to be constituted partly by the forces that attempt to institutionalize and regulate the existing order; and partly by the struggle between the forces that attempt on the one hand to conserve and on the other hand to transform the existing order. The meanings and purposes of the world order, and the changes in structures that it may help to create, emanate from its stresses and conflicts.

Historical dialectic perceives the current historical development as follows. There is a powerful globalizing economic trend that aims to develop the free market system on a world scale by opening national economies and deregulating transactions. This trend is weakening the protective responses of societies at the national level, and therefore a protective response at the global social level is yet to take form. However, the elements of opposition to the socially disruptive consequences of this type of globalization have already been observed. Further development of globalization would reveal what form these oppositions may take, and whether and how they may become more coherent and powerful enough, such that historical thesis and antithesis would lead to a new synthesis. In this way, world order becomes the arena of conflict between the forces that support the freedom of movement of powerful homogenizing economic forces, on the one hand, and the forces that need to create regulation in order to protect diversity and the less powerful, on the other hand.

The global economy has become distinctly different from international economic relations, which are the international economic flows assumed to be subject to state control and regulation. Global production and global finance have become spheres of power relations that both constrain the state system and are influenced by it. They are creating a new social structure of production relations that is replacing the nation-centered, labor-capital relations of the past. They are decentralizing the production organizations and are encouraging mass migratory movements from South to North that

are leading to new global patterns of social conflict and new sources of conflict within national borders.

It is increasing less important to perceive societies as confined within territorial limits, and it is increasingly more important to perceive of a stratified global society in which elites of globalization have the impetus in shaping the social order – including the ideology in which it is grounded – and other social groups are relatively powerlessness – either acquiescent or frustrated. The elites of globalization form a common structural force, even though they compete among themselves for primacy in their common movement. The relatively powerless face obstacles in their greater cohesion because they are fragmented by nationality, ethnicity, religion, and gender. However, their subordination manifests the formation of the global society. The way that their concerns will be articulated is critical for the future of world order.

Global finance has drastically reduced the capacity of states to follow autonomous economic and social policies in pursuit of the protection of their populations. Indeed, whenever states have attempted to protect their masses they have faced retaliation, initially financial, ultimately perhaps military, from the powerful states. These states house the centers of financial power and military power. Such power centers attempt to sustain the globalizing world economy, while the global social processes are generating the social cleavages between and within the First and Third Worlds.

The biosphere suffers from both the global economy and the states. The global economy, which is motivated by profit maximization, has not yet confronted an authoritative regulator to moderate its destructive ecological effects. There have only been several interventions through the inter-state system to avoid specific noxious practices. The states can cause massive ecological destruction when they engage in war.

The dominant economies that support globalizing tendencies accelerate a process of cultural homogenization. This is spread by the world media, and sustained by certain modes of thought and practices among business and political elites. In opposition to this homogenizing tendency, there are distinct identities and distinct cultural traditions that straddle state boundaries to express their identities in global politics. Social movements such as environmentalism, feminism, and the peace movement also transcend territorial boundaries. These various developments are leading to modification of the Westphalian inter-state system into a multi-level system of political authorities with micro- and macro-regionalisms, and trans-border identities interacting in a more complex political process.

Currently, the military power of the United States is dominant, but its economic power is lessening. Hegemony is not necessarily obtained either by military or economic power alone, or even in combination. Hegemony is decisively dependent on cultural and ideological factors. Hegemonic decline of the United States is a matter of current debate. However, the very fact that it is the subject of current debate indicates a weakening of the ideological dimensions of hegemony, even if it proves nothing about the material power relations underlying hegemony.

5. Radical Structuralist View

World-system theories provide an explanatory framework for world order. These theories are founded on a conception of the totality of the world system. This conception regards states as constitutive units that have a structural relationship predetermined by the world economy. This relationship is expressed in terms of core and periphery, with

an intermediate category of semi-periphery (see Brunheim 1985, 1986, 1995; Callinicos, Rees, Harman, and Haynes 1994; Dryzek 1995; Duffield 2001; Falk 1969, 1987; Gowan 2001; Held 1987; Held and McGrew 2002; Scholte 2000; Walker 1988; and Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1984, 1991. This section is based on Cox 1996).

The term 'state' refers to the political aspect of an entity which is conceived primarily in economic terms. Core economies dominate peripheral economies. That is core economies determine the conditions under which peripheral economies produce and thereby core economies extract surplus from peripheral production for the benefit of the core. Through this economic relationship, the core produces underdevelopment in the periphery. Semi-periphery economies are stronger than the periphery economies and are somewhat able to protect themselves from this kind of exploitation, and are in constant struggle to attain core status.

States and inter-state relations are the political superstructures that maintain and perpetuate the exploitative core-periphery economic relations. Core states are stronger than periphery states, and therefore, core states are able to penetrate and do penetrate periphery states. Semi-peripheral countries in their struggle try to strengthen the semi-peripheral state so that it can gain autonomy in relation to the core states. Economic protectionism, economic nationalism, and national planning, whether socialist or state capitalist, are principals that the semi-peripheral states use in their struggle for greater local control over development.

The core-periphery dominant structural relationship is maintained not only by external pressures but also by the support from select social categories in the periphery country who benefit from the relationship. State, military, and economic elites in the periphery country play a major role in maintaining the relationship. They survive on material and ideological support from the core. They maintain their position internally either by exclusion of the domestic social forces from political and economic power, for example, by suppressing opposition or trade unions, *etc.*; or by manipulation of the domestic social forces with respect to political and economic power, for example, by allowing only 'domesticated' opposition parties or controlling trade unions, *etc.* Where this peripheral power structure is overthrown, its elements count on the resources of the core (financial, intelligence, and ultimately military) to destabilize and subvert the governing forces that have taken power from them.

This core-periphery political structure of domination is part of the world-wide socio-economic structure that tends to integrate the peripheral economies into the world economy, which is shaped by the core. In this world economy, the core requires that the peripheral economies be open to foreign investment from core, to imports of core goods and services from core, and to exports of profits to core. The structure of labor control in the periphery is different from that in the core. In the periphery, they aim at a supply of docile and cheap labor. This is because the economic function of the periphery is not only to supply inputs to the higher value added production of the core but also to absorb part of the core's output. This subordination of periphery labor relative to the core labor not only contributes to maintaining terms of trade favorable to the core but also separates the interests of core labor (which benefits from the core-periphery relationship) from periphery labor. Furthermore, in the periphery economy, a minority of labor force who is employed in core-owned direct investments is integrated into the world-economy becomes affluent, while the majority of local labor force remains relatively

deprived. The world-system structure perpetuates itself by dividing the potential opposition forces.

The world-system theory sees the world order as an instrument for institutionalizing the core-periphery structure of domination. The role of the world-economy agencies – the IMF and the World Bank – is to force peripheral economies to stay open to world-economy forces, and to maintain their outward economic orientation as against any locally-inspired tendencies toward auto-centric development.

These international economic agencies are ruled by core countries with majority control. They are the means by which core-oriented policies are imposed on peripheral countries, while economic relations among core countries are arranged through other mechanisms. Indeed, a two-tier system of economic regulation was placed during the 1960s: a top level consisting of only the advanced capitalist countries, and a bottom level consisting of Third World countries, on which the advanced capitalist countries collectively imposed their economic conditions.

Technical assistance through international agencies, which are under the influence of core countries, is used as a means to force internal structural adjustments in the periphery countries to fit the requirements of the world economy. International and bilateral to Third World countries aid is part of the general mechanism of subordination of the Third World, in which internal structures of dominance and dependency reinforce external pressures.

The two phases of the crisis in the world order which started in the 1970s are explainable to a considerable extent within the framework of world-economy structuralism. The quasi-withdrawal of the United States from the UN system during the late 1970s and the 1980s was due to the perception that peripheral countries were using their majority in the major assemblies and conferences without regard to world-economy requirements. The United States and other core countries allowed international finance to take its toll on a debt-ridden Third World, while offering safeguards to prevent any Third World disruption of the world-system. By the early 1990s, economic discipline was widely restored in the Third World, and regimes favorable to policies of adjustment to the world-economy were in place. Consequently, the concerted opposition to core-country goals within the major international organizations was subsided. The longer-term goals became sustaining favorable governments in Third World countries and setting examples against instances of radical deviation. The Gulf crisis set such an example and signaled that the ultimate response against the defiance of the world-economy hierarchy is military. The core countries have many means of intervention (financial, intelligence, communications, and military) within periphery countries and in addition have the support of class allies in these countries. Any threat to the structure of dependency would face retaliatory response, including response through international institutions.

World-system's epistemological foundation is structural-functional. It is based on a structure of relationships that are coherent and self-reproducing. Within that structure, it is concerned with economic practices, social forces, and states. World-system theory emphasizes the international linkages of economies in dominant-dependent relationships.

6. Conclusion

This paper discussed globalization and world order from the point of view of four broad worldviews or paradigms. The functionalist paradigm views world order as transna-

tional business community, the interpretive paradigm views world order as historically specific, the radical humanist paradigm views world order as multifaceted and multilayered, and the radical structuralist paradigm views world order as class-determined. It was emphasized that while each explanation by itself is meritorious, collectively they provide a much broader, deeper, and balanced understanding of the phenomenon under consideration.

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