# Chapter 5

## Political Aspects of Globalization

In the chapter we will discuss an important and interesting problem: why states lose their sovereignty and furthermore why they voluntary renounce their sovereign prerogatives. These processes are a part and result of globalization. However, modern world is changing rapidly. So there is some reason to divide the chapter into two sections. In the first one we will describe the processes as they have been observed before the beginning of the global financial crisis. The analysis of changes which the crisis brings about in the process of globalization and political transformation (including the sovereignty change) at the moment and in the near future are presented in the second section (see also Grinin 2009c, 2010b, 2011b; Grinin, Korotayev 2010a, 2010b). Besides, it will be devoted to estimating the probabilities of various scenarios in the development of the World System within the forthcoming decades.

**Section 1. WHY DO STATES LOSE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION?**

The process of globalization undoubtedly contributes to the change and reduction of the scope of state sovereign powers. The problems of national sovereignty in political science have always played the essential role since Jean Bodin's times. However, no wonder that in the last two decades there appeared new aspects in this field, especially in the context of discussing the issues of globalization and new world order. In the world political science the subject of change, 'diffusion', or 'disappearing' of national sovereignty started to be raised in the late $20^{th}$ – early $21^{st}$ century in connection with the problems of globalization and new world order (see, *e.g.,* Giddens 1990; Walker and Mendlovitz 1990a; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Farer 1996; Gelber 1997; Held *et al.* 1999;

Grinin 1999a; Gilpin 2001; Gans 2001; Courchene and Savoie 2003a; Held and McGrew 2003b; Weiss 2003; Tekin 2005; Ilyin 1993b; Ilyin and Inozemtsev 2001; Tsymbursky 1993 *etc.*).[1] In my opinion, the processes of sovereignty change nowadays are among the most significant. It is reasonable to speak about the transition of most countries and the system of international relations in general to the new state of sovereignty. Presumably, if such processes (of course with much fluctuation) gain strength it will surely affect all spheres of life, including changes in ideology and social psychology (the moment which is still underestimated by many analysts).

On the one hand, much is said about the way globalization strengthens factors that objectively weaken the countries' sovereignties. On the other hand (note that this point is debated surprisingly little and occasionally), since the postwar times, increasingly more states have been willingly and consciously limiting their sovereign rights. That is why in the present chapter in the wide context of changing national sovereignty a special attention is devoted to the study of deliberate voluntary reduction of sovereign prerogatives.

So it is important to recognize that change and reduction of nomenclature and scope of state sovereign powers is a bilateral process: on the one hand, the factors are strengthening that fairly undermine the countries' sovereignty, on the other – most states voluntarily and deliberately limit the scope of their sovereignty. Naturally, one can also speak about the whole range of important directions, tendencies and processes, which constitute manifold and complicated (and in many respects contradictory) dynamics of world political processes; and, as a consequence, they do not only limit sovereignty but also, in some way, evidently consolidate it (see *e.g.,* Weiss 2003; Courchene and Savoie 2003b: 8–9; for the analysis of various views on these problems see Thomson 1995; Held and McGrew 2003a, 2003b).

## 1. WHY IS THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY DIFFICULT AND AMBIGUOUS?

In political science sovereignty is usually defined as the most essential attribute of the state in the form of its complete self-sufficiency *i.e.,* its su-

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[1] For an almost exhaustive survey of such works prior to 2001 see ICISS 2001.

premacy in domestic policy and independence in the foreign one (see, *e.g.,* Jary and Jary 1999: 311; Averyanov 1993: 367; Held 2003: 162–163). This notion became widespread in the 19ᵗʰ century. But already at the beginning of the Modern Age it got quite a definite interpretation in the works by Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes and others (see, *e.g.,* Held 2003: 162–163; Hinsley 1989; Shinoda 2000; Ilyin 1993a, 1993b, 2001).

Within the Westphalian system of international relations (formed after the Thirty Year War and 1648 Peace Treaties of Westphalia, see, *e.g.,* Gross 1948) the principles of state sovereignty gradually obtained the all-European, and then universal appreciation (see about these principles Held *et al.* 1999: 37–38). However, it is important to note that this 'normative trajectory' of international law was fully described only by the end of the 18ᵗʰ – early 19ᵗʰ century (*Ibid.*: 37), this was especially connected to the events of the Great French Revolution, and also with Napoleon Wars and a new order established after the Vienna Congress in 1815 (see about it, *e.g.,* Gelber 1997: 4; Barkin and Cronin 1994: 115; Shinoda 2000). At present the UNO Charter and some other international agreements contain regulations on the states' sovereign equality and nations' right to self-determination which together with the increasing degree of external security of most countries, in our view has sufficiently contributed to the consolidation of the idea of national sovereignty in international affairs in the second half of the 20ᵗʰ century. Indeed, as we will see further, the tendency toward the recognition of the sovereign rights is combined with the tendency toward their voluntarily constraint by the sovereigns themselves.

However, the notion of sovereignty is one of the most difficult and ambiguous (see, *e.g.,* Maritain 1950; Stankiewicz 1969: 291; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Krasner 2001: 134), and its content has constantly changed and continues changing in connection with the transformations of international relations and characteristics of the states themselves, even in connection with complexity of definition of the notion of state (see, *e.g.,* Kratochwil 1986; Mitchell 1991; Barkin and Cronin 1994; see also Chapter 1.5 in this book; Grinin 2006d, 2007e; about the cradle of European state sovereignty see de Mesquita 2000; see also Ruggie 1993). This content also changed depending on who is implied as the supreme sovereign: a feudal monarch with the right to 'grant or split states when sharing the inheritance', an enlightened absolute monarch

who acts on behalf of people, or the nation itself (see, *e.g.*, Yan 1996). Besides, the sovereignty that is absolute in theory of states was always strongly and even fatally limited by different factors (see, *e.g,* Garner 1925; Shinoda 2000). Sovereignty can be regarded in different aspects (*e.g.,* as positive and negative sovereignty [see Jackson 1990]) and versions.

In other words, the notion of sovereignty is not univocal and indisputable but provokes numerous debates and, thus, demands a considerable elaboration, including various approaches to the classification of the states themselves possessing sovereignty. Thus, Giddens, for example, distinguishes state-nations and nation-states correspondingly as typologically earlier and later (Giddens 1985, 1990, 1991; Giddens and Pierson 1998; see also Barkin and Cronin 1994). There is a multitude of other theories, *e.g.*, of quasi-states (Jackson 1990).[2]

In political science one gradually becomes aware of the necessity of re-interpretation and re-appraisal of the notion of 'sovereignty' in connection with the emergence of the world political community, defining boundaries of private sovereignty, principles of their combination with each other and building their hierarchy, and also taking into consideration actions of other different subjects: MNC, numerous non-governmental organizations, multinational structures and arrangements, also considering the development of various global ideologies, for example, Global Civil Society (see, *e.g.,* Averyanov 1993: 368; Utkin 2000: 41–42; Luneev 2005: 114–115; Vincent 1986; Walker and Mendlovitz 1990b; Camilleri 1990; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Thomson 1995; Daniels and Alarie 2003; Johnson and Mayrand 2003; Keane 2003; Laxer and Halperin 2003; Tekin 2005). One can agree with Harry Gelber's conclusion: the last decade of the 20th century showed the incapacity of the national state to solve increasing complexity of problems of a global character (Gelber 1997: 12). In particular the 1990s witnessed

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[2] J. E. Thomson fairly believes that a more precise definition or a reconsideration of the definition of sovereignty is absolutely necessary (Thomson 1995). Such statements with respect to sovereignty, including the most radical ones have been already made for a long time. For instance, Jack Maritain as early as in the 1950s proved that political philosophy must eliminate sovereignty both as a term and a concept because of its supposedly inherent falsity, which misleads some researchers (Maritain 1950: 343). At present the reasoning for reconsideration of the sovereignty concept has been intensified; different versions of such a term-transformation are suggested. However, the researchers still fail to find a consensus.

the appearance of numerous works on comprehension of different aspects of the sovereignty notion because of the events connected with the direct interference and military intervention (including the one sanctioned by the UN) with respect to particular countries such as Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and others (see, *e.g.,* Mayall 1991; Roberts 1991: 519–520; Helman and Ratner 1992–1993; Rosas 1994; Tesón 1996; Acevedo and Grossman 1996; Diamond 1996; Regan 1996).[3]

## 2. GLOBALIZATION, ECONOMY, AND WORLD POLICY

Globalization is a result of a very complicated alloy of political, social, economic, civilizational and many other processes of the modern world. But among these numerous factors one should especially mark out the huge changes in modern productive forces, media, world trade and specialization (Medvedev 2004: 3; Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007b). It is significant that many researchers first of all point out the economic nature of globalization (*e.g.,* Zuev and Myasnikova 2004: 54; Kaplinsky 2003: 4; see also, Anilionis and Zotova 2005). But one should bear in mind the significant fundamental idea that we have already maintained (Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007b, 2009b): to consider economic and technical changes as an 'engine' of globalization means to admit the non-stop character of the process of globalization or the impossibility to break or turn it back, as nowadays it is impossible to stop or hamper the development of new technologies.[4]

Technology and trade entangle the world with new network connections and make national boundaries transparent (see Strange 2003; Held

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[3] Naturally, the reasons for military and other intervention into different countries and its legacy has always been a significant research issue (see, *e.g.,* Eley 1972; Vincent 1974; Tillema and Wingen 1982; MacFarlane 1983–1984). However, in the 1990s the number of similar works sharply increased. The above-said can be proved, *e.g.*, by the fact that in the mentioned reference (ICISS 2001) the matter of sovereignty is combined with the theme of the direct intervention (non-intervention) in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries; and more than a half of about 160 items of this bibliography are dedicated just to this theme; at the same time the absolute majority of the works is referred to the 1990s.

[4] To control the process of globalization – and such appeals, as well as complaints of its chaotic and unjust character are quite noticeable (see, *e.g.,* Martin and Shuman 2001; Stiglitz 2003; Byazrova 2004; Callinicos 2005; Homsky 2002; Lyu 2005; see also Dinello 2003; Galkin 2005) – one should in the first place control directions and rates of economic and technical development that seems a utopia nowadays. However, certain obstacles on the path of this progress in the form of different regulations and quotas will probably appear in future, as I prove it in my another study (for more details see Grinin 2005; also 1999a).

2003; Habermas 2003; Daniels and Alarie 2003; Russel 1997; Beck 2001; Castells 1999, 2002; see also Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2006e, 2007b; Katzenstein, Keohane, Krasner 1998; Reuveny 2010; Heshmati and Lee 2010; Yeoman 2010). Such a situation combined with other factors harshly complicates the conditions external towards the society (Ivanov 2000: 14; see also Kratochwil 1986; Hansen and Park 1995). And, as a result, globalization strongly reduces and changes the scope of national sovereignty and undermines the position of a state as that of the principle subject of international affairs (see Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007b, 2009d, 2009f). Thus, changes in production forces in this or that way lead to changes of all other spheres of life including also the political one.

This implies an important conclusion that we have already pointed out in other works (Grinin 2005, 2007b, 2009f): if the inevitable result of globalization appears to be the reduction of sovereignty, then it implies huge changes in behavioral patterns of states, corporations and groups, as well as of ordinary people. And though debates about destinies of a state (whether it is dying or consolidating) are quite frequent (see, *e.g.,* Thomson 1995; Gilpin 2001; Held and McGrew 2003a: 121–125; Tekin 2005), the consequence in question is rarer discussed.[5]

Only quite recently in a number of works globalization (following some American political scientists) is sometimes defined as a process of the USA's will obtrusion to the rest of the world, as the process of establishing new world order, profitable for the USA (on this see Baz-

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[5] On the possible scenarios of the future it is necessary to say that some of these predictions are quite straightforward and present a simplified extrapolation of the past processes. In my opinion, the future processes will most likely reveal some circumstances which are impossible to foresee from the position of our today's experience. On the other hand, some analogies still can exist. For example, in some way the analogy is quite appropriate with rise of the centralized states in the Middle Ages and at present. And these processes usually passed with much difficulty and at the same time essentially differed in various regions and periods. Naturally, the integration at the regional and, moreover, global scale does not bear any analogy to the process of empire formation; however, it is evident that there will be more than enough compulsions and violations, breaking of stereotypes and also the morbid humiliation of national pride (for more details see Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007b, 2009f). Speaking about future tendencies one should take into account that to my mind the assumptions about the tendency to form 'the new world government body' sound rather doubtful (Neklessa 2002). Properly speaking, the ideas of world government emerged long ago and were popular after World War II, but they still remain unrealistic (see the analysis of the problem in question: Bull 2003: 579–580; Beck 2001; Salmin 1993). We also find rather doubtful – especially in respect of nowadays problems encountered by some EU members – the assertions that the European Union must fairly and inevitably transform into a centralized formation like the US of Europe (Lukyanov 2005).

hanov 2004; Brzezinski 1997; Medvedev 2004: 3; Stolyarova 2002: 72; Terentiev 2004; Collins 2002: 118). There were many prophecies that *Pax Americana* would be established. But the fact is that the presence of some tendencies does not mean that the future is already predetermined. Though even now the USA's influence is evident and quite real.[6] The situation is changing dramatically (for more detail see below in the second section of the chapter; see also Grinin 2010c; Grinin, Korotayev 2010c) as some scholars proposed (see, *e.g.*, Todd 2004).[7]

Thus, the direction, forms and results of the processes will be constantly dependent on the changing balance of the world forces, on the strategy that will be chosen by these or those countries and associations, on different geopolitical factors and combinations. In my opinion, it means that those who are longing for playing a more important role in the integrating and changing world must forecast and foresee the tendencies to use them for their own benefits (about the available possibilities for the lesser countries see: Harris 2003: 65). Undoubtedly, Russia will be able to play an essential role in the new world order if it chooses the right strategy. Thus, one should not mourn for the globalization passing in the American style (see, *e.g.,* Krylova 2004), but find a proper place in the stream of global processes without loosing one's peculiarities, particularly using common cultural-linguistic traditions in the vast territories of the CIS, and also Russian natural geopolitical and resource advantages (this, by the way, has become apparent in the Russian economic strategy during the last several years) and develop economic strength including the renaissance or creating of different branches of machine construction and industry (there is no sufficient understanding of this point).

But what after all globalization is? Its generally accepted definition does not exist and presumably it will not appear in the immediate future, as far as it has most diverse meanings (for some interpretations of globalization see, *e.g.*, Eisenstadt 2010; Kiss 2010; Gay 2010; concerning the formal measuring of globalization see Dreher *et al.* 2010). Without any claim to a unequivocal definition, I would determine it in

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[6] Including the cultural level. One can agree that nowadays 'the chief "globalizers" are the Americans' (Berger 2002).

[7] Even Zbignev Brzezinski was in some doubt concerning the effectiveness of the USA's modern policy and appeals to a deeper comprehension or reformulating foreign policy goals and the American ideology more precisely, believing that it must determine its security in such categories, which will be able to suit others' interests (see Brzezinski 2004).

the following way. **Globalization is a process as a result of which the world becomes more connected and more dependent on all its subjects. Both the increase of the quantity of problems common for states and the expansion of the number and types of integrand subjects take place.**

In other words the peculiar system emerges, where the problems of separate countries, nations, regions and other subjects (corporations, different associations, global media holding companies *etc.*) interlace into one tangle. Separate local events and conflicts influence a great number of countries. At the same time decisions in the most significant centers of the world have an effect on all the fates. In general the processes of globalization in the broadest sense are characterized by the abrupt intensification and complication of mutual contacts in the basic branches of the economic, political and social life, gaining planetary scales (Ivanov 2004: 19). Globalization is an exclusively versatile process. Practically all spheres of life experience its impact (see, *e.g.,* Giddens 2004).[8] Lots of positive as well as negative phenomena also gain a global character, *e.g.*, the struggle for the preservation of the environment, the antiglobalistic movement itself (see, *e.g.,* Levin 2003; Gay 2010; Xu Yanling 2010), terrorism and crime (see, *e.g.*, Mirsky 2004b: 80; Luneev 2005: 114–115), drug mafia *etc.* In this sense the idea of globalizing Islam and other religions is of great interest (Mirsky 2004a: 35; see also: Schaebler and Stenberg 2004; Eisenstadt 2010; Robertson 2011); human rights (Sapkota 2011; Taran 2011; Collins 2010).

Any development always means that a certain part of changes makes the situation sometimes worse in comparison with the previous events (see in more detail Grinin 1997a: 68–69; 2006f: 92–94; 2007e). In my opinion the reducing of the scope of sovereign prerogatives leads both to positive and negative consequences (see, *e.g.,* Kiss 2010; Bauman 2011; Etzioni 2011; Krastev 2011). Thus, the greater than before openness of boundaries provides not only the increase of trade but also contributes to the expansion of terrorism and facilitates drug traffic. At the same time, the balance of advantages and disadvantages looks different for different countries, regions, territories and even dif-

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[8] A definite vector in the direction of globalization is present even with respect to such seeming strictly national organizations, as parliaments. For example, now the number of international interparliamentary organizations is about several dozen (see, *e.g.,* Saidov 2004).

ferent social strata. This implies such an ambiguous perception of glob-alization. This is not in vain that its critics point at the irregularity in benefiting globalization and the increasing gap in the living standard of different countries (see, *e.g.,* Capra 2004: 171).[9] It is important to note that setting up the outlines of the new order, globalization thereby breaks the old one, functioning within the state system's framework, therefore, the speed of the destruction of old relations often exceeds the speed of the formation of the new ones. In particular, in a number of countries this becomes apparent in the destruction of traditional ideol-ogy, based on the sacralization of fatherland and nations, and conse-quently, in the weakening of such earlier highly evaluated qualities as patriotism due to the growth of alternative to the national preferences and identifications. But globalization has not created instead any com-plete ideology to fascinate masses. This is one of the main reasons, why Western variant of globalization seems so unacceptable for many non-Western societies.

Elsewhere I have already discussed both the above mentioned fact itself and the point that national boundaries become far less serious bar-rier for modern technical and economic forces than it was earlier (for more detail see Grinin 1999a; 2006e: 158–159; 2007f, 2007k). Many factors contribute to this, especially the powerful development of trade, transport, and the role of the international capital, MNC *etc.* (see Strange 2003; Held 2003; Habermas 2003; Castells 1999, 2002). It is also worth keeping in mind that in the process of world globalization not only states but more and more territories and regions interact (Gre-benschikov 2004: 89). I have also pointed out that the most rapid-growing branches of industry are just supranational in their nature. As a case in point I can mention space technologies or Internet which are more and more actively used for commercial purposes. Figuratively speaking, a person nowadays acquires functions of a mini-station ac-cepting and transmitting different information often leaving aside na-tional boundaries (for more detail see Grinin 1999a, 2004b, 2005).

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[9] Indeed it is rather an ambiguous conclusion, as in some cases, *e.g.* as regards to many African countries, the gap may increase (see Leftwich 2005: 153), and at the same time in the Second and Third World countries one can see a much higher than average annual economic growth. This concerns particularly some Asian and Latin American countries, and recently many African countries as well as those of the Eastern Europe and the CIS (yet today they have hard crisis of times) (see, *e.g.,* Maddison 2001, 2007, 2010; World Bank 2005; Shishkhov 2004: 18).

Close interconnections of national economies lead to rapid and more-over, the uncontrollable reacting to the local and a fortiori global crises. This fact has been confirmed by a number of financial crises that happened in the last two decades (on the role of capital flows we have spoken in the previous chapter; see also Grinin 2010c; Grinin, Korotayev 2010b). George Soros concludes (2000) that financial markets are unpredictable and unstable in their nature. One of the main reasons of such instability is founded on the fact that political institutes fall behind economy which overgrew national limits and requires supranational planning (Van der Wee 1994: 374) and some forms of joint control over vibration sources of financial and other markets.

## 3. GLOBALIZATION AND REDUCING SOVEREIGNTY

As has been stated above, in practice the sovereign rights and powers both of states and nations were always limited by various factors (see, *e.g.,* Krasner 1995–1996). Nevertheless, in theorists' minds 'Westphalian sovereignty' (*i.e.,* unlimited sovereign rights) still existed. In present days it becomes clearer that Westphalian system with its principles of international relations has fundamentally changed.[10] It is also important to mention that nowadays the idea of states' free play seems wrong even from a merely theoretical point of view. The point is that the scope of the inner sovereignty has legally narrowed to a large degree due to the international agreements including the issues concerning human rights (see Averyanov 1993: 368; Vincent 1986; Chopra and Weiss 1992; Shinoda 2000) and what is more – actually, in connection with already formed models and traditions of states' behavior.

As Michael Mann (1997) correctly observes, in works dedicated to the transformation of the position and role of a state in the modern world we often, observe a one-sided debate on the issue whether the state system becomes stronger or weaker, meanwhile the process appears to be quite complicated and ambiguous; in some way the positions of the state system are weakening but in other ways they become stronger (see also Yan 1996: 49).[11] Thus, Susanne Strange insists that

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[10] See *e.g.*, the special issue of *International Studies Review* magazine, 2000, Vol. 2, No. 2, on the subject: 'Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order', where this problem was discussed, especially within the following articles: Burch 2000; Blaney and Inayatullah 2000; Caporaso 2000; Litfin 2000; Mattli 2000.

[11] Probably, the difficulties in interpretation of changes in world and national policy are also connected with the debate concerning the question whether sovereignty reduces or not what takes

under the influence of intense economic processes the state power becomes weaker and at the same time surprisingly notes that the state has started regulating the issues, which before people solved themselves without any state involvement, in particular how to build their own house, how to arrange family relations, so that in her point of view there is almost no sphere where the state bureaucracy would not intervene (Strange 2003: 128). She calls it a paradox though this is quite natural, as such processes never go unilinearly and only in a single direction. The general trajectory is always a complicated balance of alternate changes, though at the same time the system's weakening usually combines with strengthening of some its aspects – it occurs at the expense of its components conversion and changes in hierarchy levels.

In connection with what we have mentioned above we would like to specially emphasize the definite narrowness of the approaches even in the investigations concerning sovereignty since many authors study the issue only from the angle that powerful world economic supranational and to a great degree anonymous powers influence the transformation of national sovereignty, changing it on the whole as if in spite of or even contrary to the will of the states themselves (see, *e.g.,* Keohane 1995; Held 2003; Clark 1999; Slaughter 2000; Strange 2003).[12] At the same time another aspect of the problem is almost unnoticed (or it is not regarded sufficiently important), whereas I consider exactly an exceptionally important one: sovereignty to a large (probably, prevalent) degree is reduced *voluntarily by national states themselves*. I have already pointed out to those aspects and investigated them in a number of works (see Grinin 1999a, 2004b, 2005, 2006e, 2007b, 2008a, 2008e, 2011b).

In my opinion there is a whole range of factors which influence the process of changing national sovereignty including, of course, techno-

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place within the context of the old traditions of the theories of international relations and old arguments of different schools. At the same time in some scholars' communities there is an obvious tendency to consider sovereignty at the level of a theoretically pure phenomenon, which however for some reason must meet the reality. Nevertheless, quite obviously those real relations were often far from armchair scientists' ideas. No wonder, for any arguments of the supporters of the idea of reducing sovereignty their opponents produce proves of the fact that this situation is not new in history (see the analysis of various approaches to the comprehension of sovereignty phenomenon: Thomson 1995).

[12] The list of threats to the state sovereignty often includes: global financial flows, multinational corporations, global media empires, Internet, *etc.* and, of course, international interventions, as we see now in Libya. The globalists maintain that state authority is greatly weakened by these processes which lead to the boundaries transparency – David Held and Anthony McGrew (2003a: 124) sum up such views.

logical and economic changes (see above; for more details see also Grinin 1999a, 1999b, 2007b, 2007f, 2007k), the aspiration for escaping wars, the presence of global problems uniting countries, the processes of the regional rapprochement, the rapid extension of the scope of contacts of all types and levels among the residents of different countries; the necessity of solving the great number of issues and settling controversial questions, increasing number of democratic regimes in the world, *etc.* However, the factor of voluntariness in reducing the scope of powers for the sake of gaining extra prestige and benefits may be considered among them the most significant, moreover, this very fact, as far as I can see, defines the necessity of this movement.[13] Thereupon, I would like to draw attention to the major process lasting since the end of World War II, as a result of which many countries deliberately start limiting themselves in seemingly most sovereign things (for more detail see Grinin 1999a, 2004b, 2005, 2006e, 2007d, 2007k, 2008a, 2009c, 2009d).

It is enough even to cast a brief glance at the spheres where sovereignty has reduced to agree with above-said. The right to impose duties and taxation and define their rate; to forbid and reward import and export of goods (capitals) and some types of activity; to issue currency; to borrow; to set the rules of keeping the imprisoned and usage of their labor; to use the capital punishment; to proclaim these or those politic liberties or restrict them; to define fundamental rules of elections (and to hold them proper) and electoral qualification, and also a great number of other more or less important points, including smoking rules, have stopped to be defined only by the wishes of a state itself. Not so long ago the Europeans refused the *sanctum sanctorum* – their own na-

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[13] Certainly, it is combined with the imposition, in some cases rather tough, on the countries-disturber of international rules and agreements, and also with the attempts of a direct interference in the affairs of those countries (like, *e.g.,* some republics of former Yugoslavia, Israel, Palestine, Libya, a numbers of African and Latin American countries) that turned out to be incapable of solving inner conflicts or restraining political forces beyond control (see *e.g.,* MacFarlane 1983–1984; Mayall 1991; Roberts 1991: 519–520; Helman and Ratner 1992–1993; Rosas 1994; Tesón 1996; Acevedo and Grossman 1996; Diamond 1996; Regan 1996). Naturally, such actions of the International Community or separate countries and coalitions (the USA, NATO) also have a great effect on changing of sovereignty and establishing precedents for the future. Nevertheless, it may be claimed that just predominant voluntariness in reducing sovereignty essentially contributes to the formation of a tolerant or even approving opinion to such interference on the part of the whole (or majority) of the world public, without which any intervention can neither succeed nor even take place.

tional currencies that had been developed for centuries for the sake of one common currency (euro). Finally, what has always been regarded the main thing in sovereignty – the right of war and peace – is under international control. It was only 50 years ago when Russel and Einstein in their famous manifesto wrote: 'To extirpate war it will require measures for the limitation of the national sovereignty which will wound national pride' (see Adamovich and Shakhnazarov 1988: 185). Today such a control no longer hurts national pride. World wars and totalitarianism showed that absolute sovereignty including also the right to unleash wars and repressions is dangerous.[14] **Hence it is possible to make an important though on the whole obvious conclusion: a state`s domestic affairs where nobody intervenes and which are regulated only by national law and traditions, are contracting and international law or law of a definite community (of collective participation) is expanding** (Grinin 2005, 2007c, 2008d, 2009a, 2009d).[15]

Thus, one can summarize that the voluntary reduction of sovereignty means in practice and from the juridical point of view a) the expansion in national practice of the norms of some international agreements, declarations, conventions *etc.*; b) the recognition of these or those norms of international law as dominant over the national ones; c) the recognition of these or those decisions of a definite international agency (*e.g.*, the court) as the dominant over the decisions of national

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[14] For instance, Jack Levy in his article clearly brings out that though during the last five centuries the wars between the Great Powers were diminishing in number per time unit, but on the other hand they were constantly increasing in size, heaviness, intensity, concentration and to some extent also significance (Levy 1982).

[15] At the same time it is important to mention the fact that during the first post-war decades simultaneously with the increasing reduction of sovereignty the opposite processes took place, and as a consequence a modern national state became a leading type of the government on the whole planet (see, *e.g.,* Held *et al.* 1999: 46), and the number of national states swiftly increased (in 1945 in there were 51 UN members, and by 1994 this number grew to 185 [The United Nations Organization 1995: 289–291; Webber 1997: 24; Inoguchi 1999: 175]). But there is no contradiction here. It is just the way the complicated processes go on by the time when either these or those forms achieve their peak, their decay already reveals itself. For example, in Europe one can observe the privileges of the nobility and the most mature organizational forms of this estate at the very period of the early bourgeoisie regime formation, *i.e.* at the moment when the 'grave digger' for the nobility (bourgeoisie) was actively developing. In this connection it is indicative that in the second half of the 20th century the sovereignty principles were especially actively accepted not in the developed countries (in particular in the former metropolitan countries) but *vice versa* at the periphery of the Western World, in the colonies getting their independence and young developing states (for more detail see: Spruyt 2000; about different historical tendencies influencing sovereignty see, *e.g.,* Inoguchi 1999).

bodies; d) finally, the **voluntary delegation of own authorities to the supranational, regional or world associations**, which seems to me an especially important and modern phenomenon.

On the whole, the process of *voluntary* sovereignty reduction, to my mind, also signifies a profound transformation of the world political system which sooner or later will demand a formation of a definite supranational political order. Besides, this means that since today many economic and other forces act as the ones undermining national states, the new order will be created to a great degree just for the sake of getting control over these at present weakly controllable actors. And naturally, such changes and restrictions will lead to great tension, conflicts and opposition in most various spheres (see below in the second section of the chapter).

Undoubtedly, in history one can find many cases of voluntary obligations and pacts, which significantly restricted the sovereignty of sovereigns and countries. Take for example the Holy Union and its interventions into the revolutionary countries in the first half of the 19th century (Male 1938), or the customs union of the German States of the first half of the 19th century (Deni and Sayo 1938: 78–80). The processes of internationalization have started not today but have already been going on for centuries constantly accelerating. But as we have already mentioned (Grinin 1999a; 2005: 16–17), the prevalence and power of these processes yesterday and today are incomparable, in other words at present they have obtained a qualitatively different level in comparison with past epochs. First, they have embraced the whole world. Second, the economic alliances were uncommon before and now they have become the most typical form of associations. And some of the economic organizations (such as WTO, IMF) encompass the majority of countries of the world. The scale and aims of political associations have also changed. Third, the intensity and regularity of state leaders' contacts have grown enormously. And the problems they solve have changed greatly. Fourth, only a few countries are able to carry out an isolationist policy today and avoid any associations (like the policy of 'brilliant isolation' that Great Britain was carrying out in the 19th century).

To emphasize the above said it might be mentioned (though it may sound strange) that today the maximum sovereignty (*i.e.,* the minimum restrictions in the use of the sovereign rights) is possessed by the countries that are closed ideologically (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and some

other Muslim countries) and also at the same time economically (such as North Korea, or Cuba), and exactly because of their 'sovereign rights' (in particular to create nuclear weapons) sharp conflicts tend to take place. But on the whole even these countries' sovereignty starts to diminish[16]. As for sufficiently open and developed countries, in our point of view the tendency to delegate their powers to the international, regional and world organizations and associations is absolutely obvious. The only exception is the USA which at times permit themselves to act regardless of many countries opinion, openly putting their national interests above the world and allied ones (see, *e.g.,* Kissinger 2002: 2; Brzezinski 2004). But it seems to us that just in this confrontation of the USA and other countries which express a certain collective opinion, probably roots the one of the main intrigue of the change of the world in the future as well as the transformation of the content of international relations principles (see Grinin 1999a: 28–29; 2005: 9, 25–26; see also Todd 2004). Yet recently, especially due to the crisis, the USA has not that openly opposed its interests to those the other countries.

**Thus, there is completely no doubt that today in comparison with the past the sovereignty of completely free and independent countries has become much smaller. And what is extremely important, many countries quite often give away a part of their sovereign powers voluntarily indeed** (on the situation in some Asian countries see below). I think that such an 'altruism' can be seriously explained only by the fact that such a restriction becomes profitable as instead the countries expect to gain quite real advantages (see, *e.g.,* Zlokazova 2004: 68). It is quite natural that such an 'exchange' has become possible in principle only as a result of the powerful influence of the described (and many unmentioned but implicit) processes. In my view a kind of world public opinion must be noted as an important cause of sovereignty reduction: the wider is the circle of countries voluntarily limiting their sovereignty the more inferior appear those states which do not make such restrictions.

As has been mentioned above in political science it is realized to a certain degree that the doctrine of national sovereignty has become

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[16] This is especially true with respect to China which rapidly advances regarding its economy's openness in the foreign trade sphere, so it constantly assumes new obligations reducing its sovereign rights concerning the prohibitions, duty rates *etc.*

old-fashioned (Kissinger 2002: 296), moreover, these problems were touched even in the UN Secretaries General Butros Butros-Ghali and Kofi Annan's speeches and articles (see, *e.g.,* Annan 1999; see the analysis of his ideas in ICISS 2001). However it seems that most researchers still underestimate the gravity of sovereignty changes and the necessity to re-think this notion itself in the context of modern processes as well as a great number of others, connected with it. At the same time I agree that the *state still principally remains (and will endure for quite a long time) the superior unit of historical and political life.*

However, the scope of the sovereign rights in the modern world has greatly redistributed. In particular, a number of quite important authorities are transferred immediately from states to supranational associations and institutes. The sovereignty is more often distributed between supranational, national, subnational, and sometimes regional and municipal units (Yan 1996: 49). Consequently, as has been mentioned above, new powerful factors have appeared and in the long run these factors gradually lead the state to stop being the principal sovereign and to give this place to larger supranational formations and structures. And in my opinion this tendency will increase.

On the other hand, without fail I would like to add that this is not a one-sided and univocal but a many-sided process: **sovereignty will reduce somehow (*e.g.,* in the matters concerning economic strategy) but still in some way, it will become stronger and even grow.** So, *e.g.*, Egbert Yan considers that ethnical-linguistic, cultural and social functions of the state will increase (Yan 1996: 49). That is why it is dangerous to hurry too much to bury national state, for a long time it will remain the leading player in international affairs (as on the whole one should be cautious enough while forecasting the global political changes see, *e.g.*, Bobrow 1999; Doran 1999). Besides, as some scholars fairly point out, the abrupt reduction of sovereignty and traditional functions of a state may cause chaos (Utkin 2000: 41–42).

Though sovereignty is contracting, I find this principle significant itself (more exactly – the appeal to it in certain cases), that will probably long remain one of the most important in the international affairs. That is why its open disrespect will continue to provoke condemnation. When old ideas are still alive and the new ones have not become firmly established the collisions may obtain a form of opposition of principles

which hides their historical significance. In that case it is difficult to understand who is right, who is wrong. For instance, if one bases oneself on the right of the strong to openly trample on the sovereignty principle even with respect to a dictatorial regime, the sympathy may appear on the *per se* reactionary side. The war in Iraq in 2003 proves this. That is why it appears that in the legal and moral aspects really irreproachable arguments are desirable which would be based on the world organizations decisions (the UNO in the first place).[17] That is why to support the actions against the regimes-disturbers the sanctions of exactly this kind are important (see, *e.g.*, Arbatov 2004: 77).[18]

Therefore, as has been shown above, since the end of World War II the tendency is more clearly revealed that countries gradually delegate a part of their sovereignty to the world international organizations. Even a larger part of sovereignty passes to regional associations. And the integration of states in suprastate economic associations is becoming a more and more important part of globalization. Such supranational formations are present on almost all continents and in some cases a transformation of economic alliances into political ones is outlined. Of course, the process of creating really formed, systematically and profoundly integrated suprastate formations can not be rapid. Neither will it be smooth in my opinion, since all its members can not ignore their own interests and in this or that way they will defend their interests against the others. Besides, within the countries themselves different political powers interpret national aims quite in a different way. In other words the adjustment of the supra- and intrastate interests is a difficult problem, and different confrontations are inevitable here. Besides, common aims also may be interpreted in a different way. In this sense, a very significant example is that of the USA which were able to bring together into a tight knot their purely national narrow political problems (such as the coming elections or the necessity to increase the president popularity) with world interests.

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[17] Indeed, this requires the United Nations` high prestige; however, this prestige is unfortunately rather low (see, *e.g.,* a fascinating research about the correlation of the influence of different countries in the UNO and the contentment of their position in this organization in O'Neill 1996). Besides, to achieve their own goals the USA and NATO sometimes use the UNO resolutions yet going far beyond them. The intervention in Libya is a striking example.

[18] Concerning the problems, strategies, successful and failed actions of the international court and mediation see, *e.g.*, Fischer 1982; Kleiboer 1996.

## 4. REDUCING SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONALISM

Globalization as has been proved by different studies including mine (*e.g.,* Ryan 1997; Bahcheli *et al.* 2004b; Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2009a; Grinin, Korotayev 2009a) produces a dual effect with respect to nationalism. On the one hand, there can be observed a tendency to reduction of national sovereignty, on the other – a heavy growth of nationalism and even the smallest nationalities' striving for gaining their own sovereignty (see about such unacknowledged nations, *e.g.,* Bahcheli *et al.* 2004a). The explanation of the reasons of separatism in the present period, to which I arrived, at first glance may seem paradoxical: **nationalism is gaining strength because states are weakening as systems** (for more detail see Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2009b). However, there is no real paradox here, especially taking into account that the most states' security is actually provided by the world community and the strongest states (see, *e.g.,* Pugh 1997; see also Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007a). Besides, nations are not eternal essences, but ethnopolitical societies, forming mostly within the state framework (Gellner 1991; Balibar and Wallerstein 2003; Armstrong 1982: 4) and under the influence of technological changes (concerning the influence of printing technologies on the formation of nations see, *e.g.,* McLuhan 2005: 408 and others).[19] Under certain conditions their solidarity and homogeneity intensify, and under the others – *vice versa* – weaken. So, creating the supranational systems in the 20th century proceeded parallel with the destruction of colonial empires as well as of the old and newly created states, especially multinational ones (see, *e.g.,* about Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia's collapse: Bookman 1994). Note that some of them looked rather stable (the USSR, and earlier in the beginning of the process, Austria-Hungary). And such a collapse, as I see it, fulfils in a certain sense a progressive role, facilitating regional and world integration. But it is very morbid and destructive progress, which confirms the above-said ideas that a progress and regress are going hand in hand. The matter in fact is in their balance.

Thus, I am inclined to believe that on the one hand, we may expect some forthcoming decades when national problems will stand sharply enough in different regions and countries, since the reasons for nationalist and secessionist conflicts are very diverse (for a survey of these

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[19] About the development of the views on the nature of nations and nationalism see also: Llobera 1994; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Periwal 1995; Woolf 1996; Özkirimli 2000.

grounds see, *e.g.*, Brown 1997; Beiner 1999; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Macartney 1996 [1934]**;** Özkirimli 2000; Voronovich and Romanchuk 2009). But, on the other hand, the belief is growing that the national right to the self-determination has turned into the 'opium for peoples' (see Altermatt 2000: 104; about the correlation between monoethnic and polyethnic states and the reasons for the rise of nationalism in the latter see also: Zagladin *et al.* 1995: 180–205). As Mikhail Ignatieff puts it, the narcissism of small differences between ethnoses start to flourish (Ignatieff 1999), and the consolidating ethnic ideology forms almost the main resource for the revival of the violence today (Wieviorka 2003: 109). However, at the same time although inconsistently and with difficulty, a negative attitude to the abuse of this right is formed in the world public opinion. As a consequence, in my opinion the aggressive nationalism gradually splitting up the states and producing a threat to the world order must diminish. The disappearance of nations and national differences is out of question. As we see it, the process will develop in the right direction when national affairs, problems and relations come from the sphere of the highest politics and heated fights to the quieter level, as it happened with the relations among the different directions of Christianity in the majority of European countries.

However, it is worth to mention that the level of nationalism in different countries correlates with their level of economic and political-cultural development. For example, in some Asian as well other regional states, nationalism has not yet reached its culmination in contrast to European states. The matter is the level of economy and economic relations development in certain peripheral countries most probably belongs to industrial type than to a postindustrial one. Accordingly, the level of nationalism is higher there, in large regional states it is just suitable for playing the hegemonic role in their regions (see Grinin 2008a). In some Asian and Latin American states which are economically rising and ideologically consolidating, 'nationalism' frequently emerges as a state ideology shared by the population. That is why 'nationalism' in large regional countries as the ideology of the state and citizens quite often awakes accompanied with the striving for maintaining their sovereign rights including rights to have nuclear weapons *etc.* (This is a suitable way to attract the attention of the in-

ternational community to a state during a long period as for instance Iran does.) Thus, for instance, a successful nuclear test in India has become the national pride for the Hindus although it has provoked a strong anxiety in the USA and Western countries (Srinivas 2002).

In Arab countries the growth of nationalism has always been hindered by Islam, which ideologically made all Muslims 'brothers'. But, nowadays in some Arab countries including the oil-producing ones, violent contradictions between the ideas of the state system and Islamist ideology are appearing and gaining strength as the state always requires a certain order, submission, recognition of its prevailing interests (in fact, this is the essence of domestic sovereignty) and Islamic fundamentalists believe that the interests of the state must yield to the general Islamic interests. This leads to the support of terrorism unapproved by the state, which is provided by different radical groups in Islamic countries. All this creates some tension in the society which sometimes results in the open struggle between the forces of the state sovereignty and forces of Islamic internationalism (the examples of Algeria, Turkey, Egypt are quite significant but the indicated tension exists in Saudi Arabia and in a number of other Arab countries).[20] Within the general global context this means that, on the one hand, certain Islamic states will hardly fit the formation of the new world order. But on the other hand, the necessity to control fundamentalists and extremists can induce a number of Islamic states to come into closer contacts with world community.

## 5. DIFFERENT ISSUES OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY CHANGE

It is essential to show that though the process of changing and reducing sovereignty to a greater or lesser extent refers to overwhelming majority of countries still, the basic trends of voluntary reduction of the scope of sovereign prerogatives are very different in Europe, the USA, Russia, the CIS, the Islamic world, Far Eastern states, North and Tropical Africa, Latin America and other non-Western regions. Moreover, the fu-

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[20] The turbulent events of late 2010 and 2011 in a number of Arabian countries can be also considered to a certain degree as a manifestation of Arabian nationalism as in those events the political organizations took an active part which have affiliates in many Arabian countries. On the other hand, further social revolutions could contribute to the strengthening of nationalism.

ture of non-Western cultures depends much on the way this process will proceed.

First of all, it is worthy noting that the voluntary reduction of sovereignty is more characteristic of Western (or closely related with them economically or culturally) countries. And, on the contrary, the transformation of sovereignty in other civilizations and countries with different cultural traditions proceeds with more difficulty and also is closely connected with the level of economic development. These countries are usually not post-industrial, but industrial or agrarian-industrial, *i.e.* they belong to the type of states that are tightly connected with sovereignty and the state regulations or protection. Perhaps, just for this reason the regional powerful states like China, India,[21] Pakistan and Brazil are less inclined to reduce their sovereignty as compared with the European countries. For China's and India's level the classical (Westphalian) type of state sovereignty is much more preferable than the present (or more precisely coming) type, vague and obscure one. Nevertheless, one should pay attention that Japan also is not at all in a hurry to demonstrate the reduction of its sovereignty.

China's striking economic success drives a number of scientists to conclude that China will play one of the most important or even leading roles in the future global world (on this point discussion see Grinin 2010c; Grinin, Korotayev 2010c). China is vitally interested in its own economic integration into the world economy, therefore, it cannot but support globalization. But Chinese government attempts in every way to control other, especially cultural global impacts. Yunxiang Yan (2002) quite exactly calls it a *guided globalization*.

India which has been lately demonstrating prominent economic results (Srinivas 2002) is quite an unusual for Asia power, where more or less firm democratic institutions have been established. At the same time, on the one hand, the power in India is based on the principles of modern national state, and, on the other, it represents an original model of the multicultural world, where different religions, ethnic groups, classes and castes coexist. Besides, India itself is to a certain degree 'an exporter' of a number of other cultural models, which became the whole world's prop-

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[21] China and India need to be regarded not only as regional states but as states, which aim at transforming into superpowers. China demonstrates very active trade politic in Africa, South America and other regions.

erty like meditation, yoga, Tantrism *etc.* (for more detail see Srinivas 2002).

The second point is the following. As regards the particular reasons for the convergence of certain societies, it should be taken into account that in the condition of a certain bifurcation which the world is currently going through, new lines and vectors contributing to the countries uniting into supranational establishments, unions, groups, blocs and clusters depend on a variety of reasons, among which a certain feature of proximity may turn out to be critical. Beside geographical proximity, economic relations and common political (geopolitical) interests, the proximity of culture and mentality (*i.e.* civilizational affinity and similarity) can be the strongest in many cases. These specific political, cultural, and religious features may lead to the creation of some special regional or even interregional supranational approximation models. For example, Chilean political scientist Talavera asks, whether there is a special Latin way of action in the globalized world? He states, there is such a way and quite particular indicators exist which confirm this. Further on, he points at the formation of a development variant implying the coexistence of socioeconomic order based on openness and free market relations (*i.e.* a purely Western phenomenon – *L.G.*), with a conservative socioreligious regime (Talavera 2002), *i.e.*, let us add, a cultural form typical for a part of the old Europe.

*Nevertheless, in spite of all differences, the common movement to the transformation of the former type of sovereignty into this or that way is evident practically in all countries and regions, cultures and civilizations.* In this connection it is necessary to show the third point connected with regional level of sovereignty transformation. A number of the developing countries are themselves ready to unite into regional communities to assert their interests together and solve problems. For example, the regional organizations in Africa, South-East Asia and Asian-Pacific region, as well as in Latin America after the Iraq events accepted a new stricter policy concerning terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. However, they prefer to solve these problems in their own way on their own territory and by means of independent peacemaking organizations which they also develop themselves.[22] But at the same time they start to search for the means to

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[22] A recent example: the threat of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) to start intervention to Côte d'Ivoire in case the President Laurent Gbagbo does not accept the re-

minimize the risk of the violent American invasion and also of the USA using the tactics 'share and rule' against the regional members (Bayles 2004: 75; on the issues of the global security in the Third World Countries see also: Buzan 1991).

The fourth point concerns the transformation of sovereignty in respect of common tasks encountered both by developed and developing countries. Especially the matter concerns global problems (about other reasons see Grinin 1999a: 32–34). They touch the whole World community, therefore, the Western interest to solve them in the underdeveloped countries will be surely increasing. And it seems the latter in their turn will have to limit sovereignty in this or that way to fit general rules. For instance, we take the risk of supposing that as demographic and ecological problems are closely connected, probably, the regulation of population level will gradually become not only national, but also a common matter. But to solve a lot of common problems it is necessary to become aware of the fact that development cannot always widen and this requires a voluntary reducing in consumption and also the mechanisms capable of forcing the majority of countries to accept such limitations (see Grinin 1999a, 2005). As Deniel Bell figuratively mentions, we have advanced enough to be capable of realizing a new vocabulary, where a key word will be *limit.* The limits of the rise, plundering of the environment, interference in the animate nature, armament limit *etc.* (Bell 1979: XXIX). And the International Commission on the Environment and development formulated the concept of *the sustainable development,* which was passed at the UNO conference in 1992 and which includes two notions: necessary needs and limitations (Yevteev and Perelet 1989: 50). It seems quite probable that there will be allocation of rates of the economic growth in future, as without it other limitations seem impossible to reach (for more detail see, Grinin 1999a, 2005).

Peter Berger (1986, 2002) in his conception of the diversity of cultural globalizations in the world mentioned, that the final result of the global influence of the foreign culture on the native one depends much on the character of the latter, as well as on the response that the native culture is able to give to the challenge coming from the foreign (global) culture. He distinguishes four main types of variations of the relationship of these cultures: 1) the substitution of the native culture by

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sults of the elections held in the country in December 2010. The later example is Saudi Arabia' troops incursion in Bahrain, as both these states are members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.

the foreign one; 2) the co-existence of the native and global cultures without their evident amalgamation; 3) the certain synthesis of the global and partially native cultures; 4) the denial of the global culture as a result of the powerful reaction on the part of the native culture. However, probably, the number of such types of variations may be enlarged. I believe that with respect to the sovereignty prerogatives in a situation of the collision of the states with outer global influences (challenges) there may also be a whole range of types of variants connected with the character of outer influences and peculiarities of the economical and political state of the countries (society, elite). However, at the same time one should take into account that the character of the response to the transformation of sovereign rights as compared with the influence on the cultures on the whole is much more controllable on the part of the states (society), as well as the national political forces and elites. Besides, since the balance of political forces inside the state, as well as the position itself of a particular state in the world rating can essentially change[23] one and the same state can make sharp turnings concerning the tractability or non-tractability with respect to the concession of sovereign rights.

In the connection with the above mentioned I suggest the following typology of sovereignty transformation:

*Western and Russian types*:

• *the European type* of the supranational community (with a number of subtypes);

• *the type of the superpower* (the American one);

• CIS–Russia (former *superpower*);

• *new countries type.* Typical of the young or somehow aggrieved states, which require an international support/recognition. The complete readiness to turn under the patronage of the more powerful supranational formation (voluntary taking its rules).

*Some non-Western types:*

• *regional leaders type.* Striving for playing the role of regional leaders as India, Pakistan, Iran *etc.* (the tractability in one direction and non-tractability in the other);

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[23] It depends, for instance, on the forces which are at the helm of a state; the prevailing spirit in a society; the economic progress and failures of a society.