
Islamism and Antisemitism. Preliminary Evidence on Their Relationship from Cross-National Opinion Data

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ABSTRACT

What do we really know about mass support for Islamism? And what is its connection to antisemitism? Our analysis of these questions is based on promax factor analytical studies based on openly available cross-national survey data. First, we analyze the determinants of what led representative global World Values Survey (WVS) global Muslim interview partners to reject to have a Jewish neighbor, which is the only available WVS item to measure antisemitism. We also identify the extent of relationships between antisemitism, the economic and social situation, religion data, and opinions on terrorism among global Muslim publics based on the global Pew Research Centre surveys. Finally, we re-evaluate Arab Barometer survey data on 'moderate Islamism' and its relationship to antisemitism. All our new quantitative evidence supports the hypothesis developed in this essay from the literature that Islamism is deeply connected to antisemitism. Our data also indicate that Muslim dissatisfaction and dissent with society, often mentioned as the drivers of Islamism, are in fact connected to Muslim secularism and a distance from Islamism. Channeling this dissent in secular left- and right-wing protest parties would be an important future task in the stabilization of Arab and Muslim democracies.

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BACKGROUND

The comparative analysis of international opinion surveys has become an important field of studies in international social science (Davidov *et al.* 2011). Without question, the assessment of public opinion among larger publics is a vital element in any fight against terrorism, and not just against Islamist terrorism (Ayalon 2002). But hard core analyses on religious values and terrorism, based on comparative international opinion surveys, are still rather scarce (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Blaydes and Linzer 2010; Ciftci 2010; Kostenko *et al.* 2014; Spierings 2014; Tessler 2002, 2004; Tessler and Gao 2005; Tessler and Robins 2007; Yeşilada and Noordijk 2010; Zussman 2014).

The discipline of comparative research on religions (Küng 2002; Sacks 2014) can be an important source of additional information in such research endeavors. Also, social scientists themselves increasingly lay the groundwork for such comparative analyses of global religions on their own (Juergensmeyer *et al.* 2013; Röhrich 2004, 2010). But these attempts as yet did not apply advanced statistical analyses to the openly available World Values Survey data.

Antisemitism, in accordance with one of the most authoritative sources on the subject (Heinemann 2007) originally was a term coined in 1879, from the Greek ἀντί – anti, and Σημ – Semite by the German agitator Wilhelm Marr to designate the then-current anti-Jewish campaigns in Europe. The word ‘*Antisemitism*’ soon came into general use as a term denoting all forms of hostility manifested toward the Jews throughout history.

The Anti-Defamation League (2014), in the largest-ever global survey of antisemitism, starts out from the assumption that antisemitism is given when a respondent consents to at least six out of the following eleven statements, thus building on a very large body of scholarship on the subject and also taking into account the contemporary Islamist adaptations of antisemitism (ADL 2014; Heinemann *et al.* 2007; Kaplan and Small 2006; Lebl 2013; Mansur 2015; Paz 2015; Röhrich 2004; Tibi 2007, 2012, 2015; Werbner 2013; Wippermann 1983; Wistrich 1991, 2004, 2007, 2010):

- 1) Jews are more loyal to Israel [than to the country/the countries they live in];
- 2) Jews have too much power in international financial markets;

- 3) Jews have too much control over global affairs;
- 4) Jews think they are better than other people;
- 5) Jews have too much control over the global media;
- 6) Jews are responsible for most of the world wars;
- 7) Jews have too much power in the business world;
- 8) Jews do not care what happens to anyone but their own kind;
- 9) people hate Jews because of the way the Jews behave;
- 10) Jews have too much control over the United States government;
- 11) Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.

In attempting to define the relationship between Islamism and antisemitism, we also should ask ourselves what is the place of antisemitism among other factors in the rise of Islamism. As Heinemann *et al.* (2007) correctly emphasize, the campaign to identify Zionism with racism, which reached its apogee in 1975 with the resolution at the UN equating the two, certainly played a major role in it. As Heinemann emphasizes, at the end of the 1970s, mass publications such as the Egyptian *Akhbār al-Yawm* articles praising Hitler's attitude to the Jews were published, quoting the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* and using stereotyped descriptions of Jews as controlling the wealth of the world, as exploiters and usurers, as a morally defective community. Under the influence of Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) (Bergesen 2008; Qutb 1990, 2000; Qutb and Algar 2006; Qutb, Salahi, and Shamis 1979), at that date the idea was first proposed that the Jews are the enemies of Islam from its inception; an independent Jewish political existence would relinquish territory within the 'house of Islam' (*Dār al-Islam*). Both the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Iranian Khomeinite Shi'a movement took up the virulent antisemitism, so characteristic of the works of Sayyid Qutb (Ganji 2013).

In this context, the next question arising in this context is what is so specific in Islamist antisemitism compared to that in the West and the former Communist countries and what leads to such differences in its forms and outcomes. With Heinemann *et al.* 2007; Kaplan and Small 2006; Lebl 2013; Mansur 2015; Paz 2015; Tibi 2007, 2012, 2015; Werbner 2013; Wippermann 1983; and Wistrich 1991, 2004, 2007, 2010 we would contend that Arab antisemitism was influenced by European anti-Semitic literature (mainly

French) published in Arabic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Anti-Semitic themes and arguments were systematically developed by Arab propaganda as a weapon against the Jewish population in Palestine during the Mandate period (1917–1948) and even more so against the newly created State of Israel (Heinemann *et al.* 2007).

The vehemence of anti-Semitic literature in Arabic has, as Heinemann with co-authors maintain, no parallel in the post-World War II era. The infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and their ‘concept’ of a ‘Jewish world conspiracy,’ was the main theme adopted by the Arabian antisemitism from the European antisemitism after the 1920s. In this context, we also cannot avoid the question what are the historical roots of the Islamist antisemitism? As pointed out correctly by Heinemann, the Quran contains the fundamental notion of the ‘peoples of the book’ referring to Christianity and Judaism, and that Islam was not interested in spiritual propaganda, and not in *conquering souls*. The Jews received a special status combining subjection and protection. Heinemann *et al.* (2007) voice the hypothesis that a source of early antisemitism in Islam might have been influenced by Byzantine traditions. In all this, the prescriptions of ritual purity and dietary laws, which united Jews and Muslims, as well as the observance of circumcision were a unifying element between Judaism and Islam in the Middle Ages. As Heinemann *et al.* (2007) correctly emphasize, the Jewish migration until the modern era usually was from Christian to Islamic countries, such as the exile of thousands and thousands of Sephardic Jews from Spain in the Ottoman Empire in 1492. The worst incidents of persecution of Jews by Muslims took place in Yemen in 1697 and in Iran in 1839 (Heinemann *et al.* 2007).

The final point which we should raise briefly in this background section is the question how does antisemitism correspond to different doctrines in Islam. Tibi (2015) emphasized that while Judeophobia is a hatred and prejudice, antisemitism is a genocidal ideology that identifies the Jews as evil and calls for their eradication. This genocidal sentiment did never exist in classical Islam. Tibi argues that the story of antisemitism in the Middle East exists in two segments, one is secular (pan-Arab nationalism), the other is religious-fundamentalist (Islamism). In terms of the history of ideas, the Islamization of antisemitism can again be traced back to the work of Sayyid Qutb, the mastermind of Islamist ideology

(Bergesen 2008). Among the Islamist movements of today, the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas cultivates antisemitism in its extremist form, fully subscribing the antisemitism adapted to Islamism by Qutb.

Just as in the 1930s, today radicalized murderers kill Jews. Today, the murderers are Islamists. The Paris and Copenhagen attacks in 2015 and all Islamist attacks ever since painfully remind us that the relationship between Islamism and antisemitism hitherto has not been sufficiently dealt with in cross-national opinion research. The Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, recently and correctly reminded the world that ‘Israel is being attacked by the same forces attacking Europe, and just as Israel stands with Europe, so too Europe must stand with Israel’ and that the Paris attacks in January, 2015 clearly demonstrate the ‘disdain of radical Islam for the values we hold dear’ (Reuters 2015; Office of the Prime Minister, the State of Israel 2015; Jerusalem Post 2015). Published empirical studies on Islamism and Islamist radicalism, relying on international opinion surveys, have hitherto ignored the anti-Semitic dimension of this movement. And since the publication of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) study on attitudes and opinions toward Jews in more than 100 countries around the world there is really no excuse for cross-national opinion research to ignore this subject. The above mentioned ADL survey, based on 53,100 total interviews among citizens aged 18 and over in 101 countries and the Palestinian Territories in the West Bank & Gaza analyzed the above mentioned negative stereotypes (eleven stereotypes; if respondents consented to six out of eleven statements they were considered to hold anti-Semitic attitudes). The overall ADL GLOBAL 100 Index Score is 26 per cent of global respondents (population weighted figures). This makes over one billion (1000 million) antisemites around the globe. In the world regions, the results are as follows (weighted percentages):

- Middle East and North Africa (MENA): 74 per cent;
- Eastern Europe: 34 per cent;
- Western Europe: 24 per cent;
- Sub-Saharan Africa: 23 per cent;
- Asia: 22 per cent;
- Americas: 19 per cent;
- Oceania: 14 per cent.

The interplay between religion, place of residence and antisemitism reveals interesting patterns as well: while only less than one-fifth of Christians in the Americas and Oceania are anti-Semitic, the share of Christians with anti-Semitic attitudes in Western Europe is already 25 per cent, in Eastern Europe it is already 35 per cent, and in the MENA region, it is a staggering 64 per cent. The data for Muslims in these regions correspond to a similar pattern: while only less than one-third of Muslims in the Americas and Oceania are anti-Semitic, the share of Muslims with anti-Semitic attitudes in Eastern Europe is 20 per cent, while in the MENA region, it is 75 per cent.

The ADL survey, for the first time in global social science literature, also measured Muslim anti-Semitic attitudes in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Based on the available population statistics for the European overall population and reliable estimates of the European Muslim population¹ we come to the conclusion that on a population-weighted basis, 54.3 per cent of the total Muslim population of 14.9 million people in these six key West European countries, harbor anti-Semitic attitudes (consenting to at least six of the eleven criteria, used by the ADL survey). Anti-Semitic stereotypes by Muslims in these countries are substantially higher than among the total national population in these six key countries of Western Europe, though lower than the corresponding figures of 75 per cent for Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The margin of error for Muslims in each country was ± 9.8 per cent, and for the combined Western European Muslim oversample for all six countries was ± 4.0 per cent.

Most prevalent was the belief that Jews have too much power in international financial markets – an anti-Jewish opinion affirmed by some 70 per cent of Western European Muslims.

The ADL also highlights that on most conspiracy-related statements, scores of European and MENA Muslims showed little difference. However, on negative statements about the ‘Jewish character’ (e.g., ‘people hate Jews because of the way they behave’ and ‘Jews think they are better than other people’) European Muslims scored substantially lower than MENA Muslims.

The antisemitism index scores were extremely high for Muslims across all six of the European countries sampled, with the lowest level recorded in France:

- *Belgium*: 68 per cent of Muslims harbor anti-Semitic attitudes, compared to 21 per cent overall; 3.5 per cent Muslim population share;
- *Spain*: 62 per cent, compared to 29 per cent overall; 2.5 per cent Muslim population share;
- *Germany*: 56 per cent, compared to 16 per cent overall; 3.7 per cent Muslim population share;
- *Italy*: 56 per cent, compared to 29 per cent overall; 1.7 per cent Muslim population share;
- *United Kingdom*: 54 per cent, compared to 12 per cent overall; 2.7 per cent Muslim population share;
- *France*: 49 per cent, compared to 17 per cent overall; 7.5 per cent Muslim population share.

The implications of these data for the European Union and its future fights against terrorism are manifold and can be easily calculated from the ADL statistics and the relevant population size figures from Eurostat and *Nationmaster*, mentioned above. Of the 506.8 million inhabitants of the European Union, we have data on antisemitism for 499.5 million people. Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovakia are missing. In this sub-sample of a hypothetical EU-24, 132.1 million people hold anti-Semitic views, which are 26.4 per cent of this total EU-24 population. We can thus indeed very safely assume that some one in four EU inhabitants holds anti-Semitic views.

It is now interesting to analyze the role of the European Muslim population, to be estimated for the EU-28 at 19.1 million people, in this process. The ADL survey data on antisemitism of the Muslim population are available only for six countries, which host 14.9 of the 19.1 million Muslim inhabitants of the European Union, and 329.4 of its 506.8 million total inhabitants.

For these six countries, mentioned above, we now can easily calculate from the ADL, and Eurostat figures a population-weighted rate of 24.3 per cent of antisemitism, which is not very much different from the total of the EU-28. The European Muslims are characterized by antisemitism rate of 54.3 per cent, *i.e.* one in two Muslims in Europe is anti-Semitic. Out of a total Muslim population of 14.9 million people in these six countries, 8.1 million people must be considered as anti-Semitic, while the total number of antisemites from the total population is almost 80 million people. The total share of Muslims in the overall population of these

six countries is just 4.5 per cent, while the 8.1-percent share of Muslim Antisemites in the total number of almost 80 million antisemites in these six countries is a staggering 10.1 per cent. While in some countries, ‘Islamization’ of antisemitism did not yet progress as fast as in other countries; the figures emerging from this exercise are alarming indeed.

Table 1

‘Islamization’ of antisemitism	
Muslim share in total country	Antisemitism
Spain	4.7 %
Italy	7.3 %
France	9.5 %
Germany	10.6 %
Belgium	14.3 %
United Kingdom	30.1 %

With all the pressing global need to confront ISIL/ISIS, for example, there are as yet even hardly any simple aggregate opinion survey data available except for the ones published by a Qatar based Arab Think Tank, the ‘Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS)’ (2015), let alone multivariate analyses about the underlying causes. The ACRPS survey data are freely available from the Internet, and arrive at the astonishing conclusion that 24 per cent of the adult population in the Palestinian Territories, 10 per cent or above of the population in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, of the Syrian refugees and in Tunisia support ISIL/ISIS, while in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon the support rates are below 10 per cent. But what are the real drivers of terror support, and what are the underlying structures of opinion, contributing to terror?

All our indicators point to the direction that antisemitism (Heinemann *et al.* 2007) of the so-called ‘moderate Islamists’ makes the spread of the ideology of brutal terrorism possible and even fashionable in the first place (Wallstreet Journal 2015). From the little evidence to be gathered from survey research, we try to illustrate this point with our results from our own new statistical evaluations of the open and available data.

The Israeli scholar and high-ranking retired analytical intelligence officer, Reuven Paz (2015) correctly maintained some time ago that the issues of the interpretation of religion, culture, and also gender relations play an all-important part in the Jihadist ideology ever since Sayyid Qutb's integral and negative perception of West-

ern culture (see also Bergesen 2008; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Juergensmeyer *et al.* 2013; Lebl 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Tibi 2007, 2012). Without confronting these issues and neatly looking the other way in an attitude of ‘political correctness’, unwilling to confront core assumptions of the Islamist ideology, research will produce only very biased and limited results.

Perhaps, the omni-presence of ‘speech codes’ / political correctness is indeed a reality in Europe nowadays; in the press, and also in social sciences, which hinders many politicians, opinion leaders, and also researchers to say that Islamism is above all anti-semitism. To proclaim that Israel is a ‘state sponsor’ of ‘international terrorism’ while it would be inappropriate to call Islamist terrorism ‘Islamist’ has become the ‘logic’ of an entire wave of peer-reviewed publications in the field of so-called ‘*critical terrorism research*’ (Jackson 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Gunning and Jackson 2011).

This kind of approach to the problems is in stark contrast to the evidence, produced by government-sponsored think tank security experts around the globe, who increasingly become aware of the devastating nature of global Islamist terrorism and its thousands of victims each month, from Nigeria to South-East Asia and also, increasingly, in Europe (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014; Neumann 2014). Such robust empirical studies, like the one prepared by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence and BBC World Service, document that now there are at least 5,042 monthly deaths from Islamist political violence in late 2014 on a global level (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014; Neumann 2014).

Recently, one could also observe a shameful silence in the Western world about the recent terrible attack by the Islamist Somali *Al Shabab* militias against Garissa University College in Kenya, where 147 students and staff were killed (BBC 2015). This pogrom against Christian students, who were singled out and shot, led to no significant wave of solidarity demonstrations in the Western world comparable in scale with the recent demonstrations against Israeli policies in Gaza.

Amidst all this, we share with Mark Heller (2015), another leading Israeli security expert, the idea that it is time to seriously analyze what sectors of Muslim society that support extremism think and do, and why they think in such a way, while important and far more

numerous other segments of Muslim society oppose radicalism and terrorism and even combat it. Given the dearth of the debate in Europe making use of existing and freely available opinion survey research instruments from many countries around the world like the World Values Survey (WVS; Inglehart and Baker 2000),² the PEW data³ or the Arab Barometer Project,⁴ we should conclude that future debates about Islamist terrorism should above all be data-driven (Tessler 2002).

For us, it is wrong to define radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with outright support for the immediate bomb-throwing terror, while neglecting the underlying ideological and dangerous radicalism and also ongoing radicalization of such organizations as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood (Lebl 2014a, 2014b) or the Turkish Milli Görüs (Vielhaber 2012), which both start, like the most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred of Jews and Freemasons and Western civilization as such, and which for many on both sides of the Atlantic appear as ‘moderate Islamists’ and worthy partners of dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which the armed terrorist groups only can develop (Lebl 2013).

THE *PECCATA NOSTRA* THEORY:⁵ ISLAMISM – A FRUIT OF ‘OUR (WESTERN) SINS’?

Without hesitation, one can say that Mark Tessler's research on our subject is the leading research in the field (Tessler 2002, 2004; Tessler and Gao 2005; Tessler and Robins 2007). A simple glance at ‘google scholar’ quotation metrics will tell us just how often his approach is now being debated in the scholarly literature on the subject (Google Scholar 2015). Tessler's main variables, measuring Islamism are:

- attitudes toward democracy;
- attitudes toward Western culture and society;
- support for terrorism (9/11 attacks, *etc.*).

But in disagreement with Tessler we understand Islamism in a much wider sense. With Tibi (Tibi 2007, 2012) one can even say that Islamism is religionised politics, based on the Arabic term *din-wa-dawla* (unity of state and religion) under a system of mandated *shari'a* law. Tibi also argues that antisemitism of Islamism is a vital component of the ideology and very different from both the old Islamic Judeophobia and modern pan-Arab nationalist antisem-

itism. Islamist contemporary antisemitism now assumes the so-called 'Jewish conspiracy against Islam since 622.' Thus, our new research strategy, focusing on such a wider understanding of Islamism, seems to be justified.

Tessler's widely received empirical analysis, based on data on Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan, came to the conclusion that Islamic orientations and attachments have at most a very limited impact on views about democracy. Strong Islamic attachments do not discourage support for democracy. Tessler and Robbins (2007) also underline that there is no support for the hypothesis that personal religious involvement, support for the platform of political Islam, opposition to Western values have an important effect on terror support (see also Kurzman and Naqvi 2010). *The real drivers of terror support, Tessler believes, are the levels of low confidence in domestic political institutions and the negative assessments of the US foreign policy.* Tessler also, at times, seems to blame the State of Israel and its policies for the rise of global Islamism (Tessler 2004).

More recent research, however, has begun to question this consensus:

- We mention here first of all Blades and Linzer (2010) with their empirical research on Muslim anti-Americanism as a domestic, elite-led phenomenon that intensifies when there is greater competition between Islamist and secular-nationalist political factions within a country.

- Spierings (2014) with his *World Values Survey* based on the study on Arab countries, linked denominational belonging (affiliation), commitment (religiosity), orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism to the support for democracy and politico-religious tolerance. In Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, tolerance levels are remarkably lower than democratic support; and political Islamist views strongly affect tolerance negatively.

- A major recent Turkish study also highlights such aspects. Cifti (2010) underlines that in ten Muslim-majority countries; perceptions of gender equality are strongly associated with democratic orientations. Political Islamism, measured by the WVS item: 'Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office,' negatively affects the democracy indicators (diffuse and specific support for democracy).

➤ A team of Russian authors, Veronika Kostenko, Pavel Kuzmichev, and Eduard Ponarin also should be briefly mentioned here (Kostenko *et al.* 2014). Their paper analyzes the relationship between the support of democracy and attitudes to human rights: in particular, support for gender equality in the countries covered by the first wave of the *Arab Barometer* project. In the Middle East 80 per cent of democracy supporters equal only 17 per cent of those who understand, value, and support democracy as they do in the Western world.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Violent antisemitism is the common denominator of all kinds of Jihadist terrorism. Data from the ADL 100 Index survey are (not yet) available for multivariate analysis by the global scientific publics. To use the *World Values Survey* data with their item on the rejection of a Jewish neighbor is very crude and constitutes only a second best solution, but realistically speaking, research has currently no alternative to gain at least a fraction of knowledge on this important subject. So, we analyzed the existing global social scientific data about the determinants of what led representative global *World Values Survey* Muslim interview partners to reject to have a Jewish neighbor. We performed a promax factor analysis of these data and we can show how Muslim antisemitism is related to other available indicators of Islamism.

Re-analyzing the global PEW data base, we also identify the extent of possible relationships between antisemitism, the economic and social situation, religion data, opinions on politicians closely to be identified with terrorism (Osama Ben Laden and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) and opinions on terrorist anti-Semitic organizations (Hamas and Hezbollah) among the totally available global Muslim representative samples.

Finally, we briefly re-evaluated the very same data as used by Tessler in his path-breaking and often being referred articles – the *Arab Barometer* survey, edition 1. While using these same data as Tessler, we reach very different results, and above all, we include the dimension of opinions on Israel.

Our analysis is well within the tradition of factor analytical studies based on openly available *World Values Survey* data (see Inglehart and Baker 2000; Tausch and Moaddel 2009; Tausch *et al.* 2014; furthermore: Blalock 1972; Gorsuch 1983; Harman 1976; IBM 2011; Jolliffe 2002; Rummel 1970; Tabachnick and Fidell

2001). Our research design features not only the analysis of the underlying factors, but also the correlation between the mathematically derived factors. For this reason, our chosen factor analytical routine is the promax factor analytical model, which is more and more given preference in mainstream methodological literature (see Finch 2006; Yeşilada and Noordijk 2010). Our data and statistical models and procedures are all publicly available. Any researcher around the globe should be able to reproduce our results. Throughout our research, we used IBM SPSS XXI software, widely implemented at academic research centers and universities (IBM 2011).

ANTISEMITISM – A KEY TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING ISLAMISM

Since the original data (*World Values Survey*) and methods (SPSS XXI) are all freely available, we concentrate here on a synthesis of the results.

The *World Values Survey* measures antisemitism by the simple rejection rates of a Jewish neighbor in national surveys. We are well aware that this is highly questionable to say the least, in view of the vast available global literature on antisemitism (The Coordination Forum 2015; Bauer 1993; Lebl 2013; Wistrich 1991, 2004, 2007, 2010).

For the 13,881 representative Muslim individuals in the *World Values Survey* with available data, we are presented with the following rates of Muslim antisemitism (rejection of a Jewish neighbor).

Table 2

Rates of Muslim antisemitism	
Russian Federation	8 %
South Africa	14 %
Albania	18 %
Bangladesh	19 %
Macedonia	20 %
Kyrgyzstan	23 %
Bosnia and Herzegovina	28 %
Uganda	32 %
Nigeria	41 %
India	64 %
Iran	75 %
Egypt	84 %
Iraq	90 %

The variables from the *World Values Survey* data base, which we used in our analysis, are to be seen in the Appendix (factor loadings with the variables of the model). Our results first of all show the significant partial correlation coefficients⁶ of antisemitism (rejecting Jewish neighbors) with other Islamism indicators, like distrust in the international political and economic order, endorsement of the veil, the call for the interpretation of laws by religious authorities, and longing for a strong leader and a redistributive democracy, the endorsement of inequality by the Islamists notwithstanding. Islamism, seen in such a way, is the quest to occupy the commanding positions of the state class (Elsenhans 1991).

Muslim antisemitism is significantly linked to the idea that only politicians believing in *Allah* are fit for public office, that co-education at universities is not permissible and that there is a cultural invasion of the Muslim world by the West. Dissatisfaction with people in national political office negatively correlates with antisemitism, throwing overboard the hypothesis that Muslim antisemitism has to do with political dissent against the rulers. Our data indicate that Muslim dissent is connected to Muslim secularism and a distance to Islamism. Channeling this dissent in secular left- and right-wing protest parties would be an important future task for the stabilization of Muslim democracies.

There are six factors in this model which can be reasonably interpreted according to the standard statistical benchmark of the *Eigenvalue*, which must be equal or greater than 1.0:

- older generation;
- Islamism and antisemitism;
- distrust of the army and the press;
- urban upper class;
- secularism;
- urban women.

In all, the model explains *61.473 per cent* of the total variance. In looking at the relevant Muslim *World Values Survey* data, it also appears that right-wing and left-wing extremists show higher anti-Semitic feelings than Muslims with a middle-of-the road political orientation. Irrespective of political ideology, average rates of antisemitism (0 = no rejection of Jewish neighbors; 1 = rejection) are about double the size of antisemitism in the global population.

The Muslim *World Values Survey* data also show that Muslim left wingers are more extreme in their rejection of Jewish neighbors than the Muslim global right. A reasonable explanation for

this could be that in the Muslim cultural environment, left-wingers want to prove that they, too, are ‘good Arabs/Muslims’ and that they, too, intensely hate Israel and hate the Jews, their secularism and left-wing ideology notwithstanding. For any close observer of contemporary political developments, our statements will not be a novelty – too clear are the facts about a rising extreme left-wing antisemitism around the globe, greatly contributing to the current surge of global Antisemitism.^{7, 8, 9} An important and growing current in contemporary social science seems to look the other way, when Molotov cocktails are thrown against synagogues, and seems to concentrate all its energies instead on such phenomena as the alleged *Israeli aggression against ‘Palestine’* in relationship to gay and lesbian rights in Israeli society (Puar 2011), or the alleged *racist constructions* of Judaism (Werbner 2013).

Kaplan and Small (2006) in their study could already show that extreme criticisms of Israel (*e.g.*, Israel is an apartheid state, the Israel Defense Forces deliberately are targeting Palestinians), coupled with extremist policy proposals (*e.g.*, boycott of Israeli academics and institutions, divestment from companies doing business with Israel), are indeed motivated by nothing else than blatant anti-Semitic sentiments.




Fig. 1 Antisemitism and self-declared position on the political spectrum

Interestingly enough, the ‘Islamism and Antisemitism’ dimension also suggests that respondents from an urban environment with an ideological distance to the existing international order, symbolized by the United Nations, a high importance assigned to *Allah* in one's life, but at the same time a certain distance to the established

Mosques, often under the de-facto control of the respective national governments, a lower level of formal education and a high confidence in the press are the ones most likely to combine antisemitism and the Islamist proposition that people who do not believe in *Allah* are not fit for public office.

Table 3

Defining the Islamism and antisemitism factor

Variables of the Islamism and antisemitism factor	Factor loadings of the Islamism and antisemitism factor
Rejecting neighbors: Jews	0.755
Reject: Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office	-0.648
No confidence: The United Nations	0.468
How important is God in your life	0.428
Size of town	0.369

Egypt, for decades influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and its networks, is still most susceptible to such kinds of anti-Semitic and Islamist mass movements (Trager 2011), while certainly the ex-communist countries with sizeable Muslim communities are the most immune.

Table 4

The country values (factor scores) of the Islamism and antisemitism factor

Country	Islamism and antisemitism	Sample Size
Egypt	0.960	1533
Bangladesh	-0.296	1071
Macedonia	-0.405	200
Kyrgyzstan	-0.599	723
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.670	405
Albania	-0.773	466

At this point, we also should emphasize that our data analysis clearly shows the close relationship between the view that inequalities should be *increased* and the Islamism and Antisemitism factor. This interesting point, revealing the anti-egalitarian character of the Islamist ideology, up to now has been particularly overlooked in ongoing research.

The Egyptian Marxist scholar Samir Amin (NSNBC 2015), debating this phenomenon, came up recently with the interpretation that the mercantile bourgeoisie is the driving element in the Egyptian Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement. In his analysis of the Arab Spring, Amin (2012) also says that,

The political culture offered by the Brotherhood is known for its great simplicity, as this culture is content with only conferring Islamic ‘legitimacy’ to the principle of private property and the ‘free’ market relations, without considering the nature of the activities concerned, which are rudimentary (‘bazaar’) activities that are unable to push forward the national economy and lead to its development.

**THE ‘MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FACTOR’?
RE-ANALYZING PEW DATA:
IDENTIFYING THE EXTENT OF RELIGIOUS,
ANTI-SEMITIC AND PRO-MARKET FORCES**

In this chapter, we analyze the close relationship between Muslim antisemitism, Muslim pro-market orientation, and the peculiarly Islamist form of religiosity. Our analysis replicates many of the findings from the above chapter and is based on the PEW data base with 7,706 Muslim interview partners from Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. 53.9 per cent *of the variance is explained by our factor analytical model*. There are three factors which can be reasonably interpreted:

- rejecting extremism;
- lack of social capital;
- religious, anti-Semitic, and pro-market.

The PEW survey questions are to be seen in our Appendix tables (factor loadings on the variables of the model).

Our results again point out the anti-Semitic nature of contemporary Islamism, which is the breeding ground for the outright and open support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and figures like Osama Ben Laden and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, just to mention two historical representatives of Sunni and Shia Islamism, featured in the PEW studies. Lamentably enough for those who hope that *liberal Islam* is a way out of the *impasse*, we must note that according to the PEW data, the frequency of prayer in the setting of Islamist tradi-

tionalism is currently *positively* associated with both the acceptancy of extremism and also the religious anti-Semitic and pro-market sentiments in the population, suggesting the urgent need to rethink basic tenets of dominant Islamic theology in the direction of humanist liberalism in the traditions of the Enlightenment (see Troll 2005). After all, the Second Vatican Council in the Roman Catholic Church, which proved to be a watershed in Catholic views on Judaism, was preceded by several decades of a very thorough theological rethinking of the foundations of the Christian faith by leading theologians (see also Bea 1966). One should not also underestimate the potential of a more thorough theological analysis of the Quranic perspective on the Torah and on Israel, all terms, which positively and frequently appear in the Noble Quran (see Bar-Zeev 2005; Hadi Palazzi 1997, 2010; Röhrich 2004).

The direct correlations between the three factors are relatively small, even if two coefficients are still significant at the one-percent level. Our results allow also some comparative insights into the opinion patterns and sociological realities of the growing Muslim population in Israel, whose political parties are now the third largest political party in the Israeli parliament (see also Zussman 2014; Schnell and Haj-Yahya 2014; Yadlin 2014).

Table 5

**Antisemitism, traditionalist religiosity and opinions
on the market economy**

	Religious, anti-Semitic, promarket
Q11G. Please, tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Jews.	0.705
Q90. How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at least once, or every day five times?	0.550
Q12A. Please, tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement. Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.	-0.443

Table 6

**The country factor scores for nine Muslim communities
including Israeli Muslim Arabs**

Country	Religious, anti-Semitic, pro-market
Egypt	0.286
Indonesia	-0.566
Israel (Israeli Muslim Arabs)	-1.650
Jordan	0.282
Lebanon	-0.438
Nigeria	-0.506
Pakistan	0.163
Palestinian Territories	0.525
Turkey	-0.495

**BEYOND TESSLER'S READING OF THE ARAB
BAROMETER RESULTS**

To make our presentation complete, we also present a brief summary of our re-analysis of Tessler's original analysis of the *Arab Barometer 1* survey data (Tessler 2002, 2004). We have to underline the fact that our results present the contradictory tendencies of the quest for democracy in the Arab countries. Again, our results by and large support our earlier research findings.

Again, there emerge Muslim-Brotherhood style Islamism and other extremist positions taken up by a fraction of Arab publics in the four analyzed countries or territories, namely, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and occupied Palestinian territories. There are ten factors which correspond to the standard required mathematical properties of the model (*Eigenvalues* above +1.0). The ten factors, which explain 56.47 per cent of total variance, are to be called:

- democratic current in the Arab world;
- Arab discontent;
- favoring democracy in general;
- the West is democratic;
- democracy completely suitable for the home country;
- people of old age with little formal education;
- distance to traditionalist religion;
- rejecting terrorism against the United States;

- female younger generation identification with democracy in the country and with the Arab League;
- pessimism about America's power.

Here, we analyze just two factors in more detail, and document our results in the Appendix. The first factor is favoring democracy in general.

Table 7

Favoring democracy in general

Arab Barometer variable	Factor loadings with favoring democracy
q2322 disagree: Democracies are indecisive and have too much of squabbling	0.786
q2323 disagree: Democracies are not good at maintaining order	0.785
q2321 disagree: In a democracy, the economy runs badly 1 = Strong agree	0.764
q5041 disagree: Democracy is a Western form of government not compatible with Islam	0.384

As we highlighted earlier, direct support for terrorism in the Arab world cannot be separated from the anti-Western general cultural atmosphere of Islamism, cultivated currently by the Islamist mass movements ('Muslim Brotherhood' and 'Milli Görüs').

Table 8

Rejecting terrorism against the United States

Arab Barometer variable	Factor loadings with rejecting terrorism against the United States
q604 disagree: US involvement in the region justifies armed operations against US everywhere	0.768
q609 disagree: Exposure to the culture of the US and other Western countries harmful effect	0.489
q5045 disagree: If a Muslim converts to another religion, he must be punished by death penalty	0.414
q4013 disagree: Men of religion should have influence over decisions of the government	0.330

That implies that someone who really favors terrorism against the United States, will think – just like the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ and the Turkish ‘Milli Görüş’ – that the exposure to Western culture has harmful effects; and she or he will also think that if a Muslim converts to another religion, she or he must be punished by the death penalty. Like the mainstream of ‘moderate Islamism’ such a person will equally argue that men of religion should have influence over decisions of the government.

Table 9 provides international decision makers with a ‘map’ of the ten main factors of opinions in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories.

Table 9

The country factor scores

Country/Territory	Algeria	Jordan	Lebanon	O. Pales- tinian T.
Democratic movement in the Arab world	-0.197	-0.526	1.156	-0.148
Arab discontent	0.738	-0.122	0.577	-0.389
Favoring democracy	-0.125	-0.045	0.421	-0.106
The West is democratic	-0.304	0.228	0.150	-0.073
Democracy completely suitable for the home country	-0.185	-0.015	0.626	-0.181
People of old age with little formal education	-0.734	0.180	-0.257	0.236
Distance to traditionalist religion	-0.101	0.180	0.288	-0.165
Rejecting terrorism against the United States	-0.114	0.016	0.778	-0.276
Female younger generation identification with democracy in the country and the Arab League	-0.434	0.300	-0.186	0.063
Pessimism about America's power	-0.187	-0.140	0.084	0.088
N =	189	292	246	632

Finally, Figs 2 and 3 highlight the relationships between the ten factors of the model for two of the dimensions, whose urgency is self-evident for the international decision makers: the rejection of terrorism against the United States and what leads Arab publics to

think that the West is democratic. Our Appendix further highlights these results.




Fig. 2. The drivers of rejecting terrorism against the United States




Fig. 3. What leads Arab publics to think that the West is democratic?

Our ‘Arab Barometer’ centered research has shown that there is an important process of Arab discontent which is connected with the desire for democracy and also which is not part and parcel of the Islamist current. This, perhaps, is the most hopeful message of this analysis. The Islamists claim that they ‘represent the masses,’ while in reality, as Samir Amin (2012) correctly argues, they are a movement deeply rooted in the mercantile bourgeoisie attempting to confer Islamic ‘legitimacy’ to the principle of private property and the ‘free’ market relations. With all the authoritarian

right wing movements in Europe and Latin America in the 1930s, Islamism shares a typical ‘class base’ of movements which quite correctly can be termed as ‘fascist’ (Wippermann 1985; Senghaas 1982). With the great majority of all these right wing movements in Europe and with the populist movements in Latin America of the 1930s, Islamism shares antisemitism as an additional and systemic characteristic. Our research also re-iterates the findings by Kostenko *et al.* 2014 about the intense generational gaps characterizing Arab politics.

Fig. 4 finally highlights the connections, emerging from our re-analysis of the *Arab Barometer* data.




Fig. 4. The quest for democracy in the Arab world

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

The evidence presented in this paper also contributes to the growing consensus in the literature that the policies of the present Obama administration towards Egypt under the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ and Turkey under Erdogan were and are deeply flawed (Pierce 2014). Pierce alleges that the only consistent aspect of the Obama administration's policy toward Egypt has been relations and engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood. Lebl (2014a, 2014b) also analyses this trend by saying that after the attacks of September 11, 2001, organizations linked to the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ have acquired a high profile in Europe, presenting themselves as Westerners' best choice of interlocutor with European Muslim

communities and exploiting the multiculturalist tendencies of EU elite interlocutors.

On an empirical level, the sound and robust political conclusion of this essay is twofold: the 'moderate Islamists' are neither moderate, nor do they represent the poor, but rather they represent a movement which has many similarities with the authoritarian right-wing movements of the 1930s in Europe and Latin America. Secular democracy movements in the Arab world and beyond in the entire Muslim world deserve our undivided solidarity, while the 'moderate Islamists' do not. By critically evaluating Professor Tessler's empirical evidence, which greatly influenced the current thinking of the Obama administration in the United States, we have come to the above conclusions.

In a nutshell, the readers of this article should find enough empirical arguments to draw the main additional political conclusion of this essay for them on their own: how long can the West and also BRICS countries ostracize Egypt's President Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi, who made a credible effort to curtail the influence of the 'Muslim Brotherhood', while Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has done everything to rehabilitate the anti-Semitic mass movement 'Milli Görüş' and his Islamist predecessor in power, Erbakan, still can consider that Turkey under his leadership is a credible candidate for European Union membership?

Europe has to make a choice, too. If the European Union is a community of values not only for the politician's Sunday speeches, we have to apply the tradition of the Enlightenment (Bergson 1935) also to our day-to-day decisions on such matters as immigration and European Union enlargement.

We concur with Mansur when he says that,

The world at the end of the twentieth century was not prepared to encounter Islamism as an ideology of hate and terror. The terrorist acts of war unleashed by Islamists on September 11, 2001 came as a shock. Since that day, the world has been informed about Islamists and now needs to recall from history how violence born of Jew-hatred or anti-Semitism does not end with the Jews; nor is it only about the Jews. Anti-Semitism was, and remains, a plague that endangers us all. There is an urgent need to quell, rather than appease, Muslim anti-Semitism. The suicidal acts of terrorism,

in which Islamists have engaged before and since the 9/11 attacks, demonstrate their willingness – should they acquire the weapons – to bring about their own version of *Götterdämmerung* in their fanatical and pagan desire to destroy the enemy. The world stands warned (Mansur 2015).

As Bassam Tibi correctly says,

In Europe following the attacks on 11 September, and more so after the assaults on Madrid, the Islamist execution of van Gogh in Amsterdam, and the [...] uprising in the suburbs of Paris, it has become in a way easier to characterize jihadist Islamism as a threat to what Karl Popper called ‘the open society’, and to condemn totalitarianism from an Enlightenment humanist standpoint without being defamed. [...] It is a fact that Islamists are constructing a putative Islamophobia by associating any suggestions that Islamism is a totalitarian ideology with an alleged demonization of Islam. Therefore, the principles of an enlightened critique of Islamists needs to be established without losing sight of the way (Tibi 2007).

Summing up our assessments, we can only concur with the statements of the great Israeli scholar Robert Solomon Wistrich (1945–2015) who recently maintained¹⁰ that there is something distorted in present day multiculturalism, which is so fashionable not only in North America, but also in Europe and in other parts of the world. We can only agree with Wistrich when he says that it is remarkable that open Western societies embracing pluralist values, which are also supposed to be good for Jews – have in effect produced in the past thirty years some virulent new strains of anti-semitism. Partly this grows out of an almost demented glorification of the Palestinians, which has nothing to do with reality. But the ‘pluralist’ attitude has also been problematic since it tends to marginalize Jews in the West as part of the oppressive ruling elites. On the other hand, Muslim immigrants in Europe today are viewed as victims; they are therefore always right and should be appeased. Jews are no longer perceived as victims. They are, according to them, rich, powerful, exploitative, and aggressive. This is not merely untrue but also an anti-Semitic stereotype.

NOTES

¹ URL: <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Religion/Muslim/Muslim-population> and <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>. Interested readers are also being referred to the author's website at <https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles> for further statistical evidence on the issues of this article.

² URL: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp> [free download facility for SPSS data files].

³ URL: <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/> [free download facility for SPSS data files].

⁴ URL: <http://www.arabbarometer.org/>. See note above.

⁵ Tessler's hypotheses imply that if America changes its policies, Islamist extremism will decrease. So we attempt to refer somewhat ironically to these hypotheses as a type of 'our sins' (in Latin: *peccata nostra*) theory, in a reference to the Roman Catholic liturgy.

⁶ Age, gender and educational level were kept constant.

⁷ URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/10992886/Anti-Semitism-on-the-march-Europe-braces-for-violence.html>

⁸ URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/aug/07/antisemitism-rise-europe-worst-since-nazis>

⁹ URL: <http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/.premium-1.606686>

¹⁰ URL: <http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/multiculti.htm>

¹¹ All downloads: July 31, 2015.

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STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Antisemitism as the key towards understanding Islamism
 13,881 representative Muslim individuals in the *World Values Survey*.
Partial correlations of rejecting Jewish neighbors

	Control Variables: Age & Gender & Education (country specific)		
	Rejecting Neighbors: Jews		
	Rejecting Neighbors: Jews – Partial Correlation	Error p	Degrees of freedom
No confidence: The United Nations	0.328	0.000	4851
Disagree: Islam requires woman to dress modestly but does not require cover face with veil	0.259	0.000	2214
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws	0.163	0.000	1518
Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent	0.151	0.000	1484
No confidence: Major Companies	0.139	0.000	4851
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor	0.135	0.000	1567
Political system: Having a strong leader	0.134	0.000	4851
Justifiable: homosexuality	-0.100	0.000	4851
Disagree: Islam requires that political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims	-0.111	0.000	1973
Justifiable: divorce	-0.173	0.000	4851
Not serious: cultural invasion by the west	-0.183	0.000	3346
Disagree: violation of Islam for male and female university students to attend classes together	-0.185	0.000	2158
Disagree: a truly Islamic country should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws	-0.215	0.000	1817
Politicians who do not believe in God are fit for public office	-0.314	0.000	4851
Dissatisfied with the people in national office	-0.475	0.000	4851

Eigenvalues and total variance explained

Factors	Eigenvalue	% of variance explained	Cumulated %
1	1.952	13.943	13.943
2	1.720	12.285	26.228
3	1.614	11.528	37.756
4	1.199	8.561	46.317
5	1.107	7.904	54.221
6	1.015	7.251	61.473

61.473 % of total variance explained

Factor loadings in the promax factor analytical model

	Older Generation	Islamism and Antisemitism	Distrust of the Army and the Press	Urban Upper Class	Secularism	Urban women
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rejecting neighbors: People of a different race	-0.132	0.190	-0.579	-0.285	-0.043	-0.346
Education level (recoded)	-0.383	-0.186	0.149	0.620	0.210	-0.244
Reject: Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office	-0.027	-0.648	0.192	0.134	0.281	-0.146
No confidence: Armed Forces	-0.081	0.067	0.561	-0.016	0.182	-0.069
No confidence: The Press	-0.013	-0.192	0.740	0.020	0.104	-0.056
Age	0.888	0.026	0.055	-0.013	-0.050	-0.039
Income level	-0.047	0.052	-0.029	0.714	-0.008	-0.032
No confidence: The United Nations	0.100	0.468	0.475	0.179	0.109	-0.007
Rejecting neighbors: Jews	0.065	0.755	-0.011	0.180	0.107	0.004

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
How many children do you have	0.865	0.106	-0.095	-0.203	-0.091	0.056
Never attend religious services	-0.068	0.130	0.085	0.038	0.803	0.129
How important is God in your life	-0.003	0.428	-0.267	-0.113	-0.699	0.164
Size of town	0.110	0.369	0.107	0.623	0.001	0.373
Gender	-0.052	0.034	-0.023	-0.018	0.045	0.851

Correlations between the factors

Correlations	Older Generation	Islamism and Anti-Semitism	Distrust of the army and the press	urban upper class	secularism
Islamism and anti-Semitism	0.100**				
Distrust of the army and the press	0.037**	-0.095**			
Urban upper class	-0.076**	0.036**	0.225**		
Secularism	-0.088**	-0.106**	0.220**	0.139**	
Urban women	0.106**	0.162**	0.028**	0.057**	-0.084**


Note: With $n = 13,381$, the correlation coefficients marked with a double asterisk (**) are significant at the 1 % level (two-tailed); see: URL: <http://www.socscistatistics.com/pvalues/pearsondistribution.aspx>.

Country factor scores


Country/Region	Older Generation	Islamism and Antisemitism	Distrust of the Army and the Press	Urban Upper Class	Secularism	Urban Women	N
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Albania	0.155	-0.773	0.320	-0.283	0.529	-0.069	466
Bangladesh	-0.266	-0.296	-0.954	-0.350	-0.407	-0.282	1071
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.135	-0.670	0.495	0.329	0.049	0.180	405

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Egypt	0.156	0.960	0.080	0.305	-0.072	0.213	1533
Kyr-gyzstan	-0.077	-0.599	0.444	-0.038	0.516	-0.086	723
Macedonia	-0.095	-0.405	1.084	-0.417	-0.475	-0.064	200

Islamism, Antisemitism and positions on socio-economic inequality



Islamism and antisemitism among global Muslim publics: the factor loadings



**The ‘Muslim Brotherhood factor’? Re-analyzing PEW data:
identifying the extent of religious, anti-Semitic and pro-market forces**

Country	N
Canada	11
Egypt	937
France	37
Germany	12
Great Britain	19
India	115
Indonesia	933
Israel	132
Jordan	963
Kenya	75
Lebanon	572
Nigeria	499
Pakistan	1198
Palestinian Territories	1127
Russia	79
Spain	7
Turkey	986
United States	4
Total	7706

Eigenvalues and total variance explained

Factor	Eigenvalue	% of variance	Cumulated % age
1	2.278	25.315	25.315
2	1.511	16.794	42.109
3	1.064	11.820	53.929

Factor loadings in the promax factor analytical model

	Reject- ing Extremi- sm	Lack of Social Capital	Reli- gious, Anti- Semitic, Pro- market
1	2	3	4
Q3A. As I read each of the following, please, tell me whether you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this aspect of your life. Your household income.	0.031	0.813	0.112
Q3B. As I read each of the following, please tell me whether you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this aspect of your life. Your family life.	-0.013	0.796	0.066

1	2	3	4
Q11G. Please, tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Jews?	0.103	0.144	0.705
Q11K. Please, tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hamas?	0.769	-0.050	-0.021
Q11L. Please, tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah?	0.816	-0.043	0.023
Q12A. Please, tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement. Most people are better off in a free market economy , even though some people are rich and some are poor.	-0.058	0.411	-0.443
Q21E. Now I'm going to read a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – Osama bin Laden .	0.597	-0.009	-0.275
Q21F. Now I'm going to read a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad .	0.744	0.104	0.055
Q90. How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at least once, or every day five times?	-0.300	0.073	0.550

Correlations between the factors


	Rejecting Ex- tremism	Lack of social capital
Lack of social capital	-0.008	
Religious, Anti-Semitic, pro-market	-0.043**	0.035**

Note: With $n = 7706$, the correlation coefficients marked with a double asterix (**) are significant at the 1 % level (two-tailed); see URL: <http://www.socscistatistics.com/pvalues/pearsondistribution.aspx>.


Country factor scores

Country	Rejecting Ex-tremism	Lack of So-cial Capital	Religious, Anti-Semitic, pro-market
Egypt	0.060	0.530	0.286
Indonesia	-0.312	-0.074	-0.566
Israel	0.215	-0.704	-1.650
Jordan	-0.158	0.399	0.282
Lebanon	0.250	-0.216	-0.438
Nigeria	-0.957	-0.147	-0.506
Pakistan	-0.121	-0.283	0.163
Palestinian Territories	-0.170	-0.252	0.525
Turkey	1.169	-0.251	-0.495


The political sociology of nine Muslim communities including Israeli Muslim Arabs – rejecting extremism



The political sociology of nine Muslim communities including Israeli Muslim Arabs – lack of social capital



The political sociology of nine Muslim communities including Israeli Muslim Arabs – religious anti-Semitic pro-market attitudes



Beyond Tessler's reading of the Arab Barometer results.

An analysis of the data from the Arab Barometer Survey – the drivers of democracy and radicalism in Arab countries (sample countries comprising only 1/6 of the inhabitants of the Arab League).

Our sample is based on the Arab barometer survey, comprising Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. Together with the suspended member country Syria, the League comprises more than 400 million people:

- Algeria
- Bahrain
- Comoros
- Djibouti
- Egypt
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Oman
- Palestinian O.T.
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Tunisia
- United Arab Emirates
- Yemen

N = 1359 interview partners with complete data

Eigenvalues and total variance explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalue	% of variance	Cumulated % age
1	3.969	13.232	13.232
2	2.236	7.454	20.685
3	1.799	5.997	26.683
4	1.512	5.041	31.724
5	1.389	4.632	36.355
6	1.369	4.564	40.919
7	1.221	4.068	44.988
8	1.190	3.967	48.955
9	1.182	3.939	52.894
10	1.075	3.583	56.477

The factors which can be interpreted as reliably reflecting the dynamics of Arab Opinion according to the Arab Barometer study, analyzed here (31.72 % of total variance explained).

	<i>Democratic current in the Arab world</i>	<i>Arab Discontent</i>	<i>Favoring Democracy</i>	<i>The West is Democratic</i>
1	2	3	4	5
q211 On the whole, recent elections not free	-0.086	0.533	-0.029	-0.062
q2321 disagree: In a democracy, the economy runs badly 1 = Strong agree	0.308	0.135	0.764	0.026
q2322 disagree: Democracies are indecisive and have too	0.147	-0.009	0.786	-0.004
q2323 disagree: Democracies are not good at maintaining order	0.317	0.042	0.785	0.046
q2324 disagree: Democracy may have its problems but it is better	-0.179	-0.010	-0.102	-0.068
q236 How democratic is Turkey?	-0.077	-0.063	0.056	0.557
q239 How democratic is the United States?	0.070	0.036	0.030	0.826
q241 How democratic is Israel?	0.088	-0.035	-0.034	0.796

1	2	3	4	5
q243 Democracy completely suitable for [respondent's country].	0.010	-0.183	0.299	0.072
q244 Very satisfied with the country's government	-0.350	-0.547	0.090	0.134
q2461 Parliamentary system not suitable	-0.149	-0.047	-0.094	0.088
q2462 A parliamentary system with only Islamic parties not suitable	0.729	0.180	0.204	0.027
q2464 A system governed by Islamic law not suitable	0.697	0.185	0.176	0.050
q4013 disagree: Men of religion should have influence over decisions of the government	0.611	0.210	0.198	0.058
q5041 disagree: Democracy is a Western form of government not compatible with Islam	0.433	-0.008	0.384	0.108
q5042 disagree: Islam requires that in a Muslim country the rights of non-Muslims are inferior	0.559	0.051	0.270	0.074
q5045 disagree If a Muslim converts to another religion, he must be punished by death penalty	0.557	0.234	0.228	0.093
q5071 disagree: Government officials are knowledgeable of citizen's needs	0.151	0.640	0.125	-0.026
q5072 disagree: Our political leaders care about ordinary citizens	0.262	0.784	0.056	0.009
q5074 disagree: Our government creates conditions for people to prosper	0.309	0.779	0.018	0.014
q602 disagree: Arab League has been effective	0.207	0.193	-0.084	-0.028
q604 disagree: US involvement in the region justifies armed operations against US everywhere	0.114	0.059	0.087	0.006

1	2	3	4	5
q606 disagree: US democracy promotion in the region has successful	0.079	0.117	0.065	-0.072
q608 disagree: The culture of US and other Western countries many positive attributes	-0.420	0.028	-0.124	-0.120
q609 disagree: Exposure to the culture of the US and other Western countries harmful effect	0.275	-0.038	0.174	0.152
q701 Age	0.176	-0.043	0.031	-0.170
q702 Sex female	-0.027	-0.023	-0.060	0.010
q703 Education	0.200	0.117	0.075	-0.032
q712 Do not often/never read the Quran	0.221	0.156	0.076	0.064
q713 Do you pray? No	0.104	0.041	0.036	-0.015
	<i>democratic current in the Arab world</i>	<i>Arab discontent</i>	<i>favoring democracy</i>	<i>The West is democratic</i>

**The factors which can be interpreted only with some caution
(further 24.75 % of total variance explained)**

	Democracy Completely Suitable	People of Old age with Little Formal Education	Distance to Religion	Favoring US Involvement	Female Younger Generation Identification with Democracy in the Country and with the Arab League	Pessimism about America's Power
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
q211 On the whole, recent elections are not free	-0.015	-0.338	-0.034	0.068	-0.157	-0.277
q2321 disagree: In a democracy, the economy runs badly 1 = Strong agree	0.211	-0.024	0.077	0.051	-0.043	0.145
q2322 disagree: Democracies are indecisive and have too	0.110	0.004	0.058	0.067	0.096	-0.009

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
q2323 disagree: Democracies are not good at maintaining order	0.263	-0.075	0.039	0.105	0.005	0.121
q2324 disagree: Democracy may have its problems but it is better	-0.690	0.066	-0.056	-0.053	-0.064	-0.083
q236 How democratic is Turkey?	0.006	0.194	0.284	-0.154	0.273	0.130
q239 How democratic is the United States?	0.051	-0.117	0.032	0.107	0.050	-0.118
q241 How democratic is Israel?	-0.002	-0.078	-0.083	0.052	-0.088	-0.011
q243 Democracy completely suitable for [respondent's country].	0.560	0.256	0.350	0.215	0.473	0.291
q244 Very satisfied with the country's government	0.101	0.423	0.175	0.125	0.384	0.269
q2461 Parliamentary system is not suitable	-0.618	-0.020	0.091	0.031	0.280	0.085
q2462 A parliamentary system with only Islamic parties is not suitable	0.125	-0.137	0.074	-0.024	-0.133	0.102
q2464 A system governed by Islamic law is not suitable	0.152	-0.056	0.067	0.184	-0.070	0.005

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
q4013 disagree: Men of religion should have influence over decisions of the government	0.253	-0.042	0.174	0.330	-0.060	-0.016
q5041 disagree: Democracy is a Western form of government not compatible with Islam	0.375	-0.128	-0.031	-0.310	0.166	0.264
q5042 disagree: Islam requires that in a Muslim country the rights of non-Muslims are inferior	0.256	0.000	0.074	-0.112	0.114	0.355
q5045 disagree: If a Muslim converts to another religion, he must be punished by death penalty	0.211	-0.118	0.179	0.414	-0.018	-0.044
q5071 disagree: Government officials are knowledgeable of citizen's needs	0.004	0.076	0.069	0.006	-0.007	0.069
q5072 disagree: Our political leaders care about ordinary citizens	0.054	-0.087	0.002	0.035	-0.117	0.142

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
q5074 disagree: Our government creates conditions for people to prosper	0.003	-0.168	0.045	0.061	-0.134	0.111
q602 disagree: Arab League has been effective	0.089	-0.176	-0.188	-0.038	-0.455	0.414
q604 disagree: US involvement in the region justifies armed operations against US everywhere	0.008	-0.032	0.038	0.768	0.024	0.009
q606 disagree: US democracy promotion in the region is successful	0.007	0.026	-0.005	-0.017	0.013	0.736
q608 disagree: The culture of US and other Western countries has many positive attributes	-0.224	0.394	-0.020	-0.054	0.156	0.126
q609 disagree: Exposure to the culture of the US and other Western countries has harmful effect	0.403	-0.012	0.134	0.489	-0.138	0.008
q701 Age	0.166	0.572	-0.273	0.024	-0.330	0.072
q702 Sex female	-0.087	-0.048	-0.133	-0.058	0.618	-0.018
q703 Education	0.069	-0.748	-0.121	0.025	-0.149	0.021
q712 Do not often/never read the Quran	0.107	-0.045	0.661	0.136	-0.075	-0.048

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
q713 Do you pray? No	0.041	-0.014	0.728	0.055	0.003	0.017
	democ- mocracy com- pletely suitable	people of old age with little formal education	dis- tance to reli- gion	favor- ing US involve- ment	female young- er generation identification with democra- cy in the coun- try and with the Arab League	peSSI- mism about Ameri- ca's power

Close-up on important factors

	q241 How demo- cratic is Israel?	q5042 disagree: Islam requires that in a Muslim country the rights of non- Muslims are inferi- or	q5045 disagree: If a Muslim converts to another religion, he must be punished by death penalty	q604 dis- agree: US involve- ment in the region justifies armed operations against US every- where	q712 Do not of- ten/never read the Quran	q713 Do you pray? No
Arab discon- tent	-0.035	0.051	0.234	0.059	0.156	0.041
Democracy suitable	-0.002	0.256	0.211	0.008	0.107	0.041
Democratic current	0.088	0.559	0.557	0.114	0.221	0.104
Distance to religion	-0.083	0.074	0.179	0.038	0.661	0.728
Favoring de- mocracy	-0.034	0.270	0.228	0.087	0.076	0.036
Favoring US involvement	0.052	-0.112	0.414	0.768	0.136	0.055
Female younger gen- eration	-0.088	0.114	-0.018	0.024	-0.075	0.003
Fundamental- ism, Anti- Americanism	-0.011	0.355	-0.044	0.009	-0.048	0.017
People of old age	-0.078	0.000	-0.118	-0.032	-0.045	-0.014
West demo- cratic	0.796	0.074	0.093	0.006	0.064	-0.015

Correlations between the factors


Correlation matrix of the components	Democratic Current in the Arab World	Arab Discontent	Favoring Democracy	The West is Democratic	Democracy Completely Suitable	People of Old Age with Little Formal Education	Distance to religion	Favoring US Involvement	female younger generation
Arab discontent	0.252**								
Favoring democracy	0.285**	-0.014							
The West is democratic	0.063	-0.066	0.065						
Democracy completely suitable	0.302**	-0.072**	0.319**	0.083**					
People of old age with little formal education	-0.186**	-0.240**	0.050	-0.018	0.066				
Distance to religion	0.009	-0.032	0.156**	0.140**	0.133**	0.132**			
Favoring US involvement	0.085**	0.042	0.071**	0.050	0.126**	0.034	0.170**		
Female younger generation identification with democracy in the country and the Arab League	-0.204**	-0.241	0.175**	0.152**	0.047	0.232**	0.320**	-0.029	
Pessimism about America's power	0.100**	-0.072**	0.186**	0.048	0.188**	0.223**	0.101**	-0.113**	0.247**

Note: With $n = 1359$, the correlation coefficients marked with a double asterisk (**) are significant at the 1 % level (two-tailed); see URL: <http://www.socscistatistics.com/pvalues/pearsondistribution.aspx>

Country factor scores

Country/ Territory	Algeria	Jordan	Lebanon	Palestinian O. T.	n =
Democratic current in the Arab world	-0.197	-0.526	1.156	-0.148	1359
Arab discontent	0.738	-0.122	0.577	-0.389	1359
Favoring democracy	-0.125	-0.045	0.421	-0.106	1359
The West is democratic	-0.304	0.228	0.15	-0.073	1359
Democracy completely suitable	-0.185	-0.015	0.626	-0.181	1359
People of old age with little formal education	-0.734	0.18	-0.257	0.236	1359
Distance to religion	-0.101	0.18	0.288	-0.165	1359
Favoring US involvement	-0.114	0.016	0.778	-0.276	1359
Female younger generation identification with democracy in the country and the Arab League	-0.434	0.3	-0.186	0.063	1359
Pessimism about America's power	-0.187	-0.14	0.084	0.088	1359
n =	189	292	246	632	1359

Acceptancy of Israel's democracy and the promax factors



Rejection of Western culture and the promax factors

